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ABSTRACT 
The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with 
two factors:  a) the question of how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need 
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into a network of embassy annexes that will cover every nation in which the United 
States has a country team.  The intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how 
to gather cultural intelligence present the United States with a strategic challenge, and 
require the examination of the type of information the Department of Defense captures, 
and what is to be done with that information.  This thesis proposes a means to collect 
ethnographic information and a structure for using it to make effective decisions in a 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with 
two factors:  a) the question of how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need 
for more cultural intelligence.  This thesis will describe a structure to assist with both 
those needs.  The premise is that an expanded and improved network of US Military 
Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and beyond.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to propose a policy that will consolidate the functions of Defense Attachés, 
Security Assistance Officers, and a proposed corps of ethnographic information officers 
into a network of embassy annexes that will cover every nation in which the United 
States has a country team.  The intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how 
to gather cultural intelligence present the United States with a strategic challenge, and 
require the examination of the type of information the Department of Defense captures, 
and what is to be done with that information.  This thesis proposes a means to collect 
ethnographic information and a structure for using it to make effective decisions in a 
variety of traditional security roles as well as in the fight against transnational terror 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
I. THE PROBLEM: DOUBLE TROUBLE  
A. INTRODUCTION: DOUBLE TROUBLE  
The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with 
two factors:  a) the question of how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need 
for more cultural intelligence (Renzi, 2006, pp. 16-22).  This thesis will describe a 
structure to assist with both those needs.  The premise is that an expanded and improved 
network of US Military Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and 
beyond.  The purpose of this thesis is to propose a policy that will consolidate the 
functions of Defense Attachés, Security Assistance Officers, and a proposed corps of 
ethnographic information officers into a network of embassy annexes that will cover 
every nation in which the United States has a country team.  The intertwined questions of 
how to fight a network and how to gather cultural intelligence present the United States 
with a strategic challenge, and require the examination of the type of information the 
Department of Defense captures, and what is to be done with that information.  This 
thesis proposes a means to collect ethnographic information and a structure for using it to 
make effective decisions in a variety of traditional security roles as well as in the fight 
against transnational terror networks.   
B. FIGHTING THE NETWORK: A NEW WAR 
President Bush himself emphasized that the US is in a new kind of war in his 
speech of September 21st, 2001:  
We will direct every resource at our command—every means of 
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of 
war—to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.  
Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a 
decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion….  Our response 
involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans 
should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we 
have ever seen. (Bush, 2001) 
After the strategic shock of September 11th, 2001, much has been made of the idea that 
the most dangerous current threat is transnational terrorism, perpetrated by the ‘new’ 
form of warfare—the technologically empowered network, as embodied by Al Qaeda and 
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its associates.  Such groups are sometimes called “dark networks” since their purposes 
are nefarious (Milward and Raab, 2002).  Among networks, Al Qaeda is of course the 
most infamous and most current, but there are several other examples from the recent 
past and present, such as blood diamond and drug cartels, leading to the conclusion that 
such networks remain a challenge in the foreseeable future.  The access of these networks 
to modern communications, transportation, and potentially to weapons of mass 
destruction makes them far more formidable adversaries than ever before in our history. 
The danger of such dark networks and the lack of government control over them were 
actually foreseen in the pre-September 11th findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission 
(Phase III) on the security environment of the 21st century: 
In the Internet age, for example, information technologies may be used to 
empower communities and advance freedoms, but they can also empower 
political movements led by charismatic leaders with irrational premises. 
Such men and women in the 21st century will be less bound than those of 
the 20th by the limits of the state, and less obliged to gain large industrial 
capabilities in order to wreck havoc. For example, a few people with as 
little as a $50,000 investment may manage to produce and spread a 
genetically-altered pathogen with the potential to kill millions of people in 
a matter of months. Clearly, the threshold for small groups or even 
individuals to inflict massive damage on those they take to be their 
enemies is falling dramatically.  As for political life, it is clear that the 
rapidity of change is already overwhelming many states in what used to be 
called the Third World….  One result is that many national armies do not 
respond to government control. Another is that mercenaries, criminals, 
terrorists, and drug cartel operators roam widely and freely. (Hart-
Rudman, 2001, p. 3-4).  
The result has been a great deal of intellectual turmoil among both civilians and 
military personnel. Out of this turmoil has emerged the cry for more special operations 
forces, better language training, increased human intelligence, better cultural intelligence, 
enhanced man-hunting techniques, and so on.  Significantly, there is a great deal of 
writing on restructuring US forces, championing the idea that “it takes networks to fight 






C. THE LACK OF CULTURAL AWARENESS 
When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region 
that was terra incognita. (McNamara, 1995, p. 32) 
At the same time, the United States is wrestling with a lack of intimate familiarity 
with other cultures, which has led to bloody surprises in current conflicts.  Regrettably, 
the traditional structure of United States military intelligence is not designed to be 
efficient at countering this threat.  Retired Army Major General Robert Scales 
highlighted the mismatch in what US intelligence captures now, and what needs to be 
captured: 
I asked a returning commander from the Third Infantry Division how well 
situational awareness (read aerial and ground intelligence technology) 
worked during the march to Baghdad. ‘I knew where every enemy tank 
was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil,’ he replied. ‘Only problem was, my 
soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-
47s and [rocket propelled grenades].  I had perfect situational awareness.  
What I lacked was cultural awareness [italics added].  Great technical 
intelligence…wrong enemy.’ (Scales, 2004).   
In this thesis, the term ‘cultural awareness’ will be more accurately defined as 
‘ethnographic information,’ and it is the key to setting policy for terra incognita. 
Although sometimes described as cultural or ethnographic ‘intelligence,’ the term 
‘information’ is more suitable because this knowledge is unclassified and usually outside 
the realm of traditional intelligence data.  The classification of ethnographic information 
into ‘intelligence’ would only limit its accessibility, which would be counterproductive. 
 The terra in this case is the human terrain, and the information about it is too frequently 
unknown to those who wield the instruments of national power.  It is this type of 
information that the United States needs in order to combat networks, anticipate 
alternative tactics such as those described by General Scales, and conduct 
counterinsurgency on a global scale. 
1. The Definition of Ethnographic Information 
According to Dr. Anna Simons of the United States Naval Postgraduate School:  
What we mean by ethnographic intelligence is information about 
indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and 
traditional methods of mobilization.  Clans, tribes, secret societies, the 
hawala system, religious brotherhoods, all represent indigenous or latent 
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forms of social organization available to our adversaries throughout the 
non-Western, and increasingly the Western, world.  These create networks 
that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; they 
come in forms with which we are not culturally familiar; and they are 
impossible to ‘see’ or monitor, let alone map, without consistent attention 
and the right training. (Simons & Tucker, 2004, p. 5) 
Such ethnographic information is the only way to truly know a society, and is thus 
the best tool to divine the intentions of its members.  The ‘indigenous forms of 
association and local means of organization’ are hardly alien concepts to us.  Our own 
culture has developed what we call “social network analysis” (Krebs, 2006) in order to 
map these associations and forms of organization.  It is the connections between people, 
and the unwritten rules of a society, that form key elements of information that, according 
to General Scales’ article, combat commanders are now demanding.  These connections 
and rules form ‘traditional methods of mobilization’ that help people either support or 
oppose US goals, and therefore demand constant attention from the government and 
forces of the United States.  Simply put, with ethnographic information we can make 
sense of personal interactions, trace the connections between people, determine what is 
important to people, and anticipate how they might react to certain events.  As the United 
States no longer has the luxury of a relatively monolithic enemy, we must be much more 
aware of what is transpiring in what amounts to a confusing cauldron of different locales 
and societies.  Each has its own ‘latent forms of social organization’ that create networks 
we cannot currently see or map, and to which we may very well fall victim unless we 
aggressively pursue this knowledge.   
D. WHAT IS STILL UNADDRESSED 
While General Scales illustrates the need for ethnographic information, and the 
Hart-Rudman Commission’s observations on networks led it to conclude that “the 
emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different US 
military and other national capabilities (2001, p.3),” the specific nature of these 
capabilities remains unaddressed. What none of these calls for better information address 
is the base issue— how to gather ethnographic information, and how to decide what to do 
with it.  Deciding what to do implies preparing and conducting operations at the time, 
place and manner of American, not foreign, choosing.  The Hart-Rudman paragraph 
above clearly identifies ungoverned or under-governed spaces of the world:  those places 
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that even if under nominal sovereign government control, are beyond the ability of the 
government to coerce.  This political wilderness is not truly ungoverned; it is just not 
controlled by the recognized state government.  Someone is in control, of that the 
observer may be sure.  But the United States frequently cannot identify who is in control, 
and by which traditional associations that control is enforced.  Drug cartels, terrorist 
organizations, tribal leaders, and so on, all have methods of enforcement that must be 
known if America is to make good decisions about intervention, assistance, or the use of 
force.  A prime example is the US relief effort for the October 2005 earthquake in 
Pakistan.  Upon arrival, the operations officer for the Combined Disaster Assistance 
Center - Pakistan (CDAK-PAK) noted the lack of current information on the country, 
even maps.  He later commented on a specific province: “Having only one US military 
guy in the last 6 years go up to the Kashmir province didn’t do us any favors” (Lt. Col. 
Aaron “Spud” Aldridge, interview, July 13, 2006, aboard the USS Coronado, San Diego, 
CA). 
This thesis will describe a mode of organization that can address both the issues 
of fighting dark networks and gathering ethnographic information.  This thesis draws on 
the experiences of others captured in their own written accounts, and through over 40 
extensive first-person interviews across Services and agencies, as well as the author’s 
own experience.  I also include 2 historical and 2 current case studies.  In the following 
text, Chapter II describes the proposed organizational solution, which is titled the 
Military Cooperation Group, as a means to gain ethnographic information and a weapon 
to fight networks.  Chapters III through VI describe the benefits of creating this structure, 
in terms of ethnographic information, command and control, information sharing, and 
war plans. Chapter VII examines 4 brief case studies to show the feasibility and 
challenges of this proposal.  Chapter VIII makes recommendations and lists issues for 
further study.  Annex A is designed to show the existing global coverage and gaps in the 
US diplomatic-military structure, which represents ‘raw material’ for the proposed 
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II. THE SOLUTION: THE MCG IS THE WEAPON TO FIGHT 
NETWORKS 
A. CONSOLIDATION OF DOD ACTIONS AT EMBASSIES 
As the Department of Defense addresses how to gain the cultural or ethnographic 
information required to make good decisions, it is first of all imperative to recognize that 
current discussions of force structure transformation do not go deep enough.  The United 
States must re-tailor its methods to cope with new post-Cold War kinds of disorder, 
especially the ambiguous area between peace and war.  The primary method should be 
the consolidation of DoD activities at embassies, and expansion of the charter for DoD 
operations conducted from embassies.  For the purposes of this thesis, I’ve dubbed this 
new center of gravity in embassies the Military Cooperation Group (MCG), which could 
also be described as an improved Military Group (MILGP), with the merger of the 
Defense Attaché Office, and some other key enablers.  The key ingredient still missing is 
a corps of experts for ethnographic information.  Such a corps of personnel has already 
been proposed, and its natural fit would be with the MCG. 
B. WHAT THE MCG SHOULD LOOK LIKE 
My purpose was to establish a modest network of US intelligence, 
operations, and planning capabilities in each capital and at the theater-
operational level, using that regional network to try to pull together and to 
coordinate the efforts that we were undertaking in each country. (General 
Wallace H. Nutting, Commander, US Southern Command, 1979 to 1983, 
quoted in Manwaring & Prisk, 1988, p. 100). 
  The Military Cooperation Group should be the building block for an overt 
counter-network, which is defined here as an official US method of organization, 
combining elements of both a network and a hierarchy, in order to combat dark networks.  
While normally the term “network” should suffice, I have chosen to use the term 
“counter-network” to emphasize a proposal for the US effort to combat sinister networks 
such as Al Qaeda and the like.  Such a counter-network could be an expanded version of 
what the former commander of US Southern Command proposed.  A generic task 




Figure 1:  The Military Cooperation Group Structure 
The exact composition of a Military Cooperation Group should be flexible and 
tailored to the host nation.  Should any neighboring countries represent denied space, the 
tools necessary to penetrate that space should factor into the composition of the MCG.  
The commander could be a Major or Lieutenant Colonel for small groups, or even a 
General Officer for groups with large and extensive missions.  In more robust MCGs, for 
example those having US advisors with host nation forces, the structure may expand to 
include additional command and control assets, such as J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics 
sections, and perhaps even a subordinate element to command the advisor teams.  In 
general, the group should include the functions of the Defense Attaché Office, the 
Security Cooperation Office, the proposed ethnographic information collectors, 
psychological operations or the Military Information Support Team (MIST), and any 
other appropriate functions, such as civil affairs or special operations personnel.  The 
MCG does not have to be completely active duty personnel, but should utilize the most 
locally appropriate mixture of US government civilians, local civilians, American 
military retirees, expatriates, third-country nationals, and so on.  
The underlying assumption is that sovereign nations with tighter control can 
usually police most of their own populations, and can be persuaded to share police-style 
intelligence.  For example, a Military Cooperation Group (MCG) in Paris is not going to 
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take unilateral action to address recruitment of angry Muslim youth in the slums of 
France, but would prefer to leave that negotiation to civilian US government agencies.  
However, even among treaty allies that are developed countries, it is important to note 
that there are zones—usually ethnic enclaves—where the host nation authorities have 
little control or knowledge.  In these cases, it could be useful to have eyes and ears 
collecting ethnographic information, and identifying threats such as the Al Qaeda 
Hamburg cell before they reach the United States.  As a rule of thumb, this thesis 
assumes that the poorer the nation, or the less internal control it has, the more extensive 
the US Military Cooperation Group (MCG) and its activities may be.   Depending on the 
posture of the MCG, the attitude of the host nation, and the strength of the US 
interagency partners, the Military Cooperation Group could become a very powerful part 
of the counter-network in that country.  In keeping with current DAO/SAO posture, this 
counter-network should remain overt.  Military personnel are accustomed to executing 
their duties in the open, and the nature of the vast majority of the tasks discussed here, 
especially the gathering of ethnographic information, is overt work.  The CIA should 
retain responsibility for its core competency in covert operations.  The covert network 
developed by the CIA should be complemented by the overt network of the MCG, 
coordinated at the embassy level between the MCG commander and the chief of station.   
In staffing overt tasks, it would be best to draw from all the Services in order to 
bring the right types of expertise to the MCG.  For example, the Navy, Marine Corps and 
Coast Guard should provide experts in littoral security issues, while the Army has a 
strong tradition of working with land forces.  Likewise, a host nation could benefit from 
the Air Force’s expertise in reconnaissance, transport, close air support, and so on.  The 
MCG should be a Joint organization in order to capitalize on the different capabilities of 
the Services, and not be Joint simply for the sake of appearances.   
It is significant to consider that many of the personnel who would staff a 
consolidated Military Cooperation Group already exist, and are active in the business.  
Annex A describes the countries where current Defense Attaché and Security 
Cooperation efforts are present or absent.  When considering the idea that the 
requirement is a mere handful of military personnel per embassy, many of whom are 
already in the field, the magnitude of the proposed expansion could be fairly easily 
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supported.  LTG Kohler, the current Director of the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, noted that when stationed at USPACOM, he recommended a team of four 
military personnel per each embassy, and emphasized the importance of a team that 
understands operations, intelligence and security cooperation (interview, 25 July 2006, 
Washington, DC).  Further, both LTG Kohler and a senior official in the Defense 
Intelligence Agency noted that it is clear that the Secretary of Defense wants such a 
consolidated effort for military activities in embassies (interviews 25 July and 3 October 
2006, Washington, DC).  
When discussing consolidation, some bureaucratic arrangements merit 
consideration.  A large point is ‘unity of command’ in-country between the Defense 
Attaché and Security Assistance personnel.  The commander of the MCG should 
probably have a dual role as the Defense Attaché in order to meet accreditation purposes.  
This unity of effort might be enhanced by seriously reconsidering the definitions of 
intelligence and security cooperation for a new century, possibly making the merger of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency an 
advantageous move.  However, such a merger is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is 
concerned mainly with the MCG at the embassy level.  An additional bureaucratic 
consideration for unity of command may be conflicting marching orders between the 
Departments of State and Defense.  For this reason, it is important to establish a clear 
military chain of command from the Geographic Combatant Commander to the MCG 
commander.  Due courtesy and effective coordination must be offered to the 
Ambassador, as he is the President’s personal representative, and in peacetime is held 
responsible for official American actions in that country.  However, the military team on 
the ground is there to execute military tasks, and those priorities come from the 
Combatant Commander. 
1. Why the Alternative Won’t Work 
Inherent in the current debate about force transformation and culture-centric 
warfare is the idea that US ground units should become more expert in foreign cultures.  
Basic cultural familiarity at the individual and unit level is necessary and should be 
pursued, but will not solve US shortfalls in the ethnographic domain.  It simply will take 
too much time and money to train every nineteen-year-old rifleman to be truly culturally 
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proficient, and the US will not expend the resources.  Such focused ethnographic training 
would also require area specialization by each unit.  The nation doesn’t have a force that 
large.  The truly in-depth knowledge of foreign societies required would imply units 
targeted to specific sub-regions, since one language and culture does not fit all areas of a 
combatant commander’s responsibility.  The southern Philippines is not Thailand, and 
Morocco has relatively little in common with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
Likewise it is dangerous to assume that knowing a single language fits a unit to a sub-
region.  For example, Kenya alone has 61 languages, ranging from 400 people speaking 
Dahalo to over 5 million speaking Gikuyu (Ethnologue, 2006).  The level of force 
structure to become truly immersed in each potential conflict area is not feasible.  This 
sort of regional focus happens now to a very superficial extent, such as the 25th Infantry 
Division’s participation in various USPACOM exercises every year.  However, when 
DOD must add units to either training or combat rotations, they must come from another 
combatant commander’s forces, who would then be working out of their cultural 
specialty. Those transplanted units are then unequipped, in spite of huge expense in their 
cultural and language training.  A telling example is that of 3rd and 7th Special Forces 
Groups, oriented to Africa and Latin America respectively, who were required to 
shoulder some of the burden in Afghanistan.  Since the nation is engaged in a “long war,” 
(White & Tyson, 2006, p. A.8) one cannot rely on only the units that are trained for that 
region.  The Department must spread out the rotations, or it will not touch the majority of 
forces.  This thesis does not propose canceling initiatives to broaden cultural and 
language training among the Services – quite the opposite. However, the argument here is 
to avoid relying solely on basic language training for the average trooper.  The Services 
should continue their plans for basic language training, in combination with an expanded 
inventory of “heritage speakers” in the Reserve Component (Defense Language 
Transformation Roadmap, 2005).  These measures will provide a much needed capability 
at the basic and intermediate level, but do not address the need for deep understanding of 
foreign societies.  A low-cost and more practical ‘main effort’ is to instead use a network 
of a few long-term people to set conditions through cultural reconnaissance, personal 
contacts, working relationships, and the construction of culturally attuned war plans.  
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This use of a few US personnel, formed into a specialized network, avoids the enormous, 
effort of trying to change an entire institution. 
C. THE MISSING LINK: WHAT A CORPS OF ETHNOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION PERSONNEL SHOULD LOOK LIKE 
The MCG could offer a clever, effective, and economical alternative—a network 
of a few people immersed in the ethnography of local mores and associations.  With this 
improved structure, the United States could use ethnographic information to see trends 
before they become shocks, fight networks, and accomplish several other tasks, which 
will be described later.  What yet needs to be developed as part of this solution is a corps 
of personnel dedicated to gathering ethnographic information.  Two key points in the 
development of an ethnographic corps are that these personnel must be devoted 
exclusively to the task without distraction, and that they must be allowed and rewarded 
for spending extended time in-country (Simons & Tucker, 2004).  This type of work 
could be labeled a form of strategic reconnaissance, and in reconnaissance matters there 
is simply no substitute for being physically present on the ground in question.  Since the 
ethnographic ground in question is actually the population, not necessarily the terrain, a 
constant and near-total immersion in the local population represents the means to turn the 
“terra incognita” that McNamara described into familiarity with “indigenous forms of 
association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of mobilization” 
(Simons & Tucker, 2004, p. 5).   
While the Defense Attaché system is charged with the overt collection of 
political-military information, and the assessment of the military situation in particular 
countries, a comprehensive effort to collect and process ethnographic information is quite 
different. In essence, this is work for a cultural anthropologist.  Regrettably, the 
anthropological community in academia has tremendous reservations about working with 
the military.  At the same time, the Security Assistance officers attached to US country 
teams often obtain a fine appreciation of the cultural aspects of their host nation, but are 
not charged with the responsibility to collect ethnographic information, and may not 
always have a smooth relationship with the Defense Attaché, if one is even assigned 
(Marisa, 2003, p. 6-11).  For all of these reasons, a specialized group of ethnographers is 
urgently needed.  The solution is for the Department of Defense to grow its own cultural 
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experts—hybrids between soldiers and anthropologists, who may not have to be 
uniformed, but do have to look at cultural matters from a security standpoint. 
D. ENORMOUS BENEFITS FROM THE MCG 
Consolidating the different DoD functions into an MCG, with the addition of an 
ethnographic corps, could produce a number of additional benefits An investment in 
round the clock presence could have several benefits, included in four broad categories. 
The first is the deep knowledge of cultures, personalities, networks, opportunities and 
dangers, and personal relationships built over time.  The second is more streamlined 
command and control for operations including limited counterterrorism, limited 
counterinsurgency, security cooperation, civil-military efforts, and psychological 
operations. The third benefit is the direct sharing of information gained about terrorists in 
both a vertical and lateral fashion.  Lastly, a good ethnographic familiarity with an area 
will provide a much better grounding for contingency plans, and the in-country personnel 
dedicated to the task will be a ready-made asset should a Joint Task Force be required for 
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III. ETHNOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
A. CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE IDENTIFIES TRENDS BEFORE THEY 
BECOME SHOCKS 
As previously stated, the gathering of ethnographic information can be crucial, 
because this deep knowledge of the local culture will automatically lead to identifying 
key personalities, networks, opportunities, and potential dangers.  The point here is to 
maintain relationships and identify trends before they become shocks.  Arguably this was 
the original intent behind the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, although with more 
of a view toward military-to-military contacts, and more emphasis on the assessment of 
military equipment and capabilities.  A predominantly military focus is where the current 
FAO program falls short, mainly for reasons of organizational culture and sparse 
numbers. Foreign Area Officers, primarily assigned to either Defense Attaché Offices 
(DAO), or Security Assistance Offices (SAO) already do good ethnographic 
reconnaissance as it relates to the host country military, but this type of information is not 
prioritized, stored, shared or used well.  Additionally, the problem with the current 
system of Defense Attaché and Security Cooperation personnel is rotations are too short.   
B. HOST NATION RELATIONSHIPS 
In addition to American officers in foreign lands, host nation officers are 
frequently sent to US military schools under traditional security cooperation programs.  
Security assistance officers are instructed to track these international students and 
maintain contact when they return home.  But the press of other duties and limited time 
in-country makes long term relationships difficult to nurture.  The Military Cooperation 
Group (MCG) should become a base of friendship for the host nation officers who have 
attended school in the US.  Allied nations generally send their most promising and best 
connected personnel to US schools.  When the allied officer becomes a key decision-
maker, he could have experienced a long, beneficial, and ongoing history with members 
of the US (MCG) in his country.  A permanent Military Cooperation Group (MCG) with 
a certain percentage of long term staff could assist in tracking these allied personnel, 
maintain close friendships, and even ask host government permission for them to 
participate should a Combined Joint Task Force become necessary in the region. 
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Unfortunately, the US Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002 has sidetracked funding 
for IMET, the International Military Exchange Training program, which is the key 
avenue to provide American schooling to foreign officers.  While some nations are free to 
pay for their personnel to attend schooling in the United States, many of the most 
vulnerable in the War on Terror cannot afford this.  For example, the entire 2004 defense 
budget for Cameroon amounted to about $132 million, or half the price of an F-22 fighter 
jet (Lubold, 2006).  The literal cost of cultivating good relationships with individuals in 
countries that are most susceptible to the evils of transnational terrorism and its attendant 
dark networks is significant for other governments, yet a relative pittance for America.  
At the same time, if the United States does not cultivate these relationships, then surely 
someone else with opposing goals will do so.  In addition to doing a much better job of 
tracking host nation officers who have been to the US, American officers should continue 
to nurture relationships with counterparts.   
An interesting example of how this can benefit us is the case of US Army Colonel 
Jeff Donald (telephonic interview, 30 September 2006).  For about half of his career, 
COL Donald maintained a good working relationship with his Belgian counterparts.  As a 
junior officer, he was an exchange officer in 1st Belgian Corps for two years.  After that, 
in a US assignment in Germany supervising the Belgian reciprocal exchange officer, 
then-Major Donald attended the war plan staff coordination meetings.  Later, he became 
the Army Attaché in Brussels for three years, and then the Defense Attaché for 4 years.  
By the time Jeff Donald was the DATT, he maintained eleven years of contact with the 
same generation of officers.  He essentially grew up in service with the host nation 
officers, and personally knew the Belgian Army Chief of Staff.  He developed 
relationships, and when, as the DATT, he asked for help, he got it.  Sometimes this 
assistance was overt and sometimes it was quiet help with sensitive issues.  Colonel 
Donald’s experience provides an interesting counterpoint to the “security assistance” 
mentality which often emphasizes that US officers need to have something tangible to 
trade for information.  On the contrary, sometimes a long-lasting personal relationship is 
the best thing to have, although it is probably best combined with the “two-way street,” 
or the ability to offer security assistance training, education, and equipment.  In either 
case, a long term presence in absolutely critical.  
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Developing his understanding of the host nation from 1985 to 2000, Colonel 
Donald understood intimately the security needs of a NATO ally, and gained the trust of 
most of its general officer corps, notably LTG Willy Hanset, the Commander of the Land 
Forces Operational Command.  This relationship proved extremely effective when the 
United States asked Belgium to provide constant year-round rotational units to the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the shorter 
duration Albania Force (AFOR).  Likewise there are sometimes classified favors1 that the 
United States asks of its friends, and after official meetings break up for the day that type 
of cooperation can only really be gained by an American officer who has earned the 
personal trust of host nation decision makers.  Donald described the difference in his 
relationship with the Belgian senior leadership, which was intimate, as opposed to his 
relations on a later tour as DATT in Ireland.  A US officer can make friends in a two year 
stint, but the relationship is rather “superficial” in Donald’s words.  
In addition to adequate time in-country, another nuance to the relationship 
between the US officer and his host counterparts is his role as a Security Assistance 
Officer, Defense Attaché, or both.  Colonel Donald was involved in selling US 
helicopters to the Irish army, in his double role as both Defense Attaché and Security 
Assistance Officer, which raises the issue of unity of command.  Colonel Donald, a 
seasoned Foreign Area Officer, liked wearing both hats.  Indeed, when asked, he favored 
a Military Group-style entity under the direction of the Defense Attaché (telephonic 
interview, 30 September 2006), because of the unity of effort that synergy like this would 
guarantee.  Regrettably, there are all too many counter-examples to Colonel Jeff Donald, 
of individuals not being allowed to stay in one culture over extended times.  A colleague 
of his, who was even promoted to Brigadier General, is more typical. In this officer’s 
FAO career, he went from an exchange position in Belgium, to various attaché jobs in 
Macedonia and Korea, then to the Army G2 staff, and different positions in Belgium and 
NATO headquarters (COL(R) Jeff Donald, telephonic interview, 30 September 2006).  
Unfortunately, so many PCS moves obviated building the sorts of ties Jeff Donald 
developed.   
                                                 
1 Sometimes the United States asks its allies to perform certain services quietly, such as the exchange 
of intelligence or the perhaps the surveillance of suspected terrorists, etc. 
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A similar example of personal relationships that were of direct benefit in 
counterinsurgency operations is the story of LTC Gabe Acosta, former military 
intelligence officer in El Salvador. During his first tour in 1983-84 he established a set of 
friendships and relationships that were very helpful.  While these working friendships 
were beneficial during his first tour, the real pay off came on his second tour in 1990-91.  
Between tours in El Salvador, as part of his stateside professional military education, 
Acosta attended the School of the Americas, where he made the acquaintance of thirteen 
more Salvadoran officers.  As a result, those officers were completely comfortable in 
sharing information with him during his second tour in country (interview, 25 July 2006, 
Pentagon).  The Gabe Acostas of the US are the best examples of how personal contacts 
can be very useful to begin with, and can be reinforced by personnel assignment cycles. 
C. DENIED SPACE 
In addition to building relationships with individuals in government and military 
capacities, it is equally important to develop similar relationships with members of local 
groups, non-governmental organizations, and other indigenous networks in friendly 
nations especially when it comes to gaining information about denied adjacent territory.  
The primary means of penetrating hostile space should be a ring of American MCGs 
surrounding nations in which US personnel cannot operate freely.  Such information can 
then be slowly and carefully crafted into influence.  A secondary means of penetrating 
denied space is to use the counter-network of MCGs to project influence via indigenous 
networks or cyberspace.  The case of ethnic Chinese networks (Williams, 1998, p. 157) 
proves instructive, because the concept of guanxi, or reciprocal obligation, extends 
beyond nations that are physically adjacent to China.  This concept of extended 
reciprocity takes the return of favors or services across both time, such as generations, 
and distance, such as continents. It therefore represents an incredibly powerful tool in the 
hands of a network with evil intent, yet a tool unexploited in US efforts.   
Since the power of both dark networks and their more benign counterparts is the 
ability to endure over time and transcend geography, US personnel can glean valuable 
insight into denied space by building on contacts beyond host nation individuals in 
adjacent countries.  A complementary method to such vicarious penetration of denied 
space is the approach taken by Ruth Benedict.  Her ethnography, The Chrysanthemum 
19 
and the Sword, written in 1944 to support the United States war effort, is a sterling 
example of the use of expatriates, refugees, exiles, businessmen, and anyone else who’d 
spent time in Japan.  Benedict used immigrant, missionary, and diplomatic communities, 
as well as open source media such as film, radio and literature, to produce an 
understanding of culture in the denied space of Imperial Japan (Simons, 2006).  Ruth 
Benedict is a pathfinder for those who are concerned with gaining insight into peoples 
who live beyond hard, impermeable borders, and there is much to be gained by 
connecting a network of military in-country teams to future Ruth Benedicts in both the 
United States and other countries. 
When considering the countries that are actually denied to US personnel, it is 
useful to remember that while a certain amount of territory around the globe is physically 
difficult to get into, the number of governments that actually deny entry to US personnel 
is quite small.  Several nations have tense relationships with the United States, but still 
host American embassies, and thus the potential for gathering information.  Many nations 
have little or no American presence due to a lack of US interest.  See Annex A for an 
analysis of US presence and denied space. 
Although a certain amount of denied space is very real, when taken together, the 
three complementary approaches described here could serve the United States well by 
identifying trends, opportunities, and potential dangers before they become shocks to 
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IV. PROVIDE LIMITED COMMAND AND CONTROL 
A. A PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS: 4 TYPES OF OPERATIONS 
This form of strategic cultural reconnaissance is crucial because its purpose 
should be to enable well-informed action.  In the realm of low-key, fairly steady state 
operations, four main categories stand out:  limited counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency; traditional security cooperation; civil-military operations; and 
psychological operations.  A properly tailored Military Cooperation Group in-country 
could provide the command and control of these operations, while a permanently 
stationed cadre would guarantee continuity.  At the moment, the US tends to station 
either no one at all in a country; a handful of attachés or security cooperation personnel; 
or a full Joint Task Force (JTF).  For either amassing knowledge of the social 
environment or controlling any operations, the first two are insufficient.   
In providing command and control for US forces, the JTF is sufficient, but overly 
burdensome in the provision of manpower for the headquarters (JTF HQ). The main 
problem with filling the JTF HQ is the Joint Manning Document approach.  Staffing the 
headquarters with a large number of Individual Augmentees (IA) drawn through the 
Services’ personnel offices places an extraordinary drain on the Services, creates JTF 
headquarters that are at best inefficient, and risks breaking formations still at home by 
stripping out leadership that may or may not be available for their home unit’s rotation 
overseas.  Part of the difficulty in command and control that the US military faces is the 
huge inefficiency of manning the JTF HQ by individual augmentees, currently numbering 
in the thousands, with about 5597 in the whole of the US CENTCOM AOR alone.  The 
bulk of several staffs are now comprised of individuals, not unit core headquarters.  For 
instance, the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan has approximately 319 individuals 
out of 347 in the headquarters.  Some of these staffs are almost 100% individuals, like the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan which has 215 out of 215 
billets filled with IAs, all of whom have different arrival and departure dates.  There is 
huge turnover with no one typically there for more than a year.  Even HQ CENTCOM 
Forward has 914 of 947 slots filled by augmentees.  The Horn of Africa JTF consists of 
about 302 individual augmentees of a 459 strong headquarters, only 89 of that total 459 
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are uniformed active duty personnel, and the remainder either reservists or contractors 
(Mr. Chris Bilello, USJFCOM J35, personal communication, October 8, 2006).  
This condition stems from the lack of MCGs established, the relatively small 
number of major unit headquarters available for rotation as the nucleus of a JTF HQ, and 
the tendency for DoD planners to opt for the JTF as the weapon of first, not last, resort.  
The proposal of an extensive network of MCGs could reverse this draining condition by 
putting a small number of personnel on Permanent Change of Station into the host 
countries, thereby providing an alternative between a handful of DAO/SAO officers and 
a full JTF, with the attendant issues of which major command is to provide the nucleus 
and how many uncommitted units to ‘break’ in providing extended rotations of 
augmentees.  In most cases, the MCG providing command and control to activities in-
country will have to recognize the “triangular relationship” between the MCG 
commander, the Ambassador, and the Geographic Combatant Commander (Dr. Kalev 
Sepp, LTC(R), interview, 19 April, 2006, Monterey CA).   
It is important to note that the military personnel in the MCG should be under the 
command of the Geographic Combatant Commander in order to safeguard the chain of 
command to the Secretary of Defense without interjecting command authority from the 
Department of State.  However, it is also a reality that short of major combat operations, 
the Ambassador is the President’s personal representative to that country and is 
responsible for all American official activities there.  The triangular relationship is not 
quite as streamlined as the average military officer would prefer and, some would caution 
about the danger of mixing military operations with such a triangle.  Therefore, in the 
event of irreconcilable conflict, the authority of Geographic Combatant Commander 
should override that of the Ambassador.  However in the ambiguous area between peace 
and war, for most day to day operations the MCG commander in reality must answer to 
two bosses.  The Geographic Combatant Commander must respect the sensitivities of the 
Ambassadors in the region, and foster among them as supporting a climate as possible for 
MCG activities. This interaction should also drive more integration within embassies.  
While this study proposes that the Geographic Combatant Commander should be 
the higher headquarters, there is a disagreement over which community should provide 
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the oversight, training, education, Washington-based command and control, consolidation 
of information from the field, and provision of policy and operational guidance out to the 
field.  Should embassy-based operations fall under the primacy of the intelligence 
community or the ‘operations’ (security cooperation) community?  In other words, should 
the training, education, information processing, and directions to the field be controlled 
more from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), or the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA)?  Certainly, both agencies utilize Foreign Area Officers, but DIA 
controls the Defense Attachés, and DSCA controls the Security Assistance (Cooperation) 
Officers.   
There are three readily identifiable options for reconciling this control issue: the 
aforementioned two in either DIA or DSCA; and a third, which would entail a merge of 
the two agencies and a complete conceptual overhaul in the fundamental definitions of 
military-diplomatic intelligence and its interconnection with military cooperation in the 
twenty-first century.  The idea of completely intertwining military intelligence with 
security cooperation is attractive from the point of view that working together with the 
host nation forces will naturally generate information, and that a certain amount of 
equipment, assistance or training enables the quid pro quo of ‘buying’ information.  This 
would imply a truly ‘transformational’ step in the Department of Defense, and because 
this study entertains no illusions about the difficulty of breaking and redefining current 
paradigms in intelligence or security cooperation, or about the difficulty involved in 
merging large, complex agencies, the practical solution seems to be a decision to award 
primary responsibility for oversight and guidance to either DIA or DSCA.  While some in 
both communities would argue that they possess the more operational mindset, the reality 
is that once the Secretary of Defense orders either agency to execute primary 
responsibility, the men and women of the department will, over time, make it work.  
 Making ‘it’ work at the embassy level means consolidating the current 
systems, and undertaking an expanded role.  The case of unity of effort thus begets the 
case for unity of command when it comes to the country team.  The MCG must have a 
commander “who understands intelligence, operations, and security cooperation,” in 
order to properly integrate all these actions (Lt. Gen. Kohler, interview, 25 July 2006, 
Washington, DC).  This commander must be capable of directing the appropriate, tailored 
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level of operations in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, security cooperation, civil-
military relations, and psychological operations.     
B. LIMITED COUNTERTERROR OR COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OPERATIONS 
The MCG could be useful for a limited scale of command and control in 
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.  The limits in this vision are defined as the 
collection of ethnographic information in peaceful environments, and control of US 
combat advisors up through the scale of violence to a point just short of full warfare.  
Smaller and low-key operations can be controlled from a leaner MCG, while more 
extensive operations, such as advising and supporting host nation forces to conduct their 
own operations, will require a more robust headquarters.  In significant and sustained 
operations that become more and more “hot,” the MCG may grow to resemble a 
traditional J-staff, and arguably, as the MCG expands to resemble a JTF headquarters, 
there should come a threshold where a JTF is established.  In general terms, such a 
threshold could be the commitment of US combat units. Major combat operations, 
requiring the commitment of large US units, will usually require a full JTF headquarters 
as currently deployed, which is addressed in chapter VI.   In the ambiguous conditions 
between peace and war, leaner MCGs should focus their limited missions to acquire the 
ethnographic information that can illuminate terrorist or insurgent connections.     
A small number of Americans, usually military Foreign Area Officers, are already 
in tune with the type of ethnographic work necessary for counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency, and some have achieved a high level of excellence.  The problem is 
that they are too few in number, and they lack a truly comprehensive focus regarding the 
ethnographic aspects of networks.  A sterling example of the capacity that the United 
States could build can be found in an officer named “David:” 
Last summer, two dozen US Army Rangers headed for the Iraq-Syria 
border to figure out how foreign fighters were slipping through western 
Iraq's barren deserts.  As they had done in the past, the Rangers took 
positions around each village and Bedouin encampment. At one village, an 
officer named David, accompanied by a small security team, strode into 
the center looking for someone who would talk. Unlike the clean-shaven, 
camouflage-clad Rangers, David wore a thick goatee and civilian clothes. 
The Rangers carried long, black M-4 carbine rifles. David walked with a 
small 9mm pistol strapped to his leg. The Rangers spoke English. He 
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spoke Arabic tinged with a Yemeni accent.  As he recounts the day, David 
met a woman with facial tattoos that marked her as her husband's property. 
As they chatted, the pale-skinned, sandy-haired North Carolina native 
imitated her dry, throaty way of speaking. "You are Bedu, too," she 
exclaimed with delight, he recalls.  From her and the other Bedouins, the 
37-year-old officer learned that most of the cross-border smuggling was 
carried out by Shamar tribesmen who peddle cigarettes, sheep and 
gasoline. Radical Islamists were using the same routes to move people, 
guns and money. Many of the paths were marked with small piles of 
bleached rocks that were identical to those David had seen a year earlier 
while serving in Yemen. (Jaffe, 2005, p. 1) 
 This is a prime example of gaining access and operational information via 
ethnographic information.  The deeper that personnel like David dig into local society, 
the more they can assess which threats are pertinent to the United States, and which are 
matters best left alone.  While a popular perception is that the CIA performs this role, this 
is only partially correct.  Civilian intelligence agencies tend to focus on key personnel in 
official positions, and trends at the grass roots level are frequently unexplored.  If the 
Department of Defense could build a robust corps of people like David, based out of each 
US embassy in the world, then our nation could appreciate the military implications of 
“networks that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; [and] come 
in forms with which we are not culturally familiar” (Simons & Tucker, 2004, p. 5).  
Sadly, the number of Davids in the Services is not nearly sufficient.  There are about 
1,000 Foreign Area Officers in the Army, with the largest number concentrated in 
Europe; and the fourth largest group—a mere 145—focused on the Middle East (Jaffe, 
2005, p. 1).  Their numbers can also be deceptive, since the duties of a FAO include 
many things that are important, but do not necessarily include ethnographic information, 
such as protocol for visits and administrative duties.  Certainly, a solution to the growing 
threats from networks is to produce more Davids and reward them for extensive time on 
the ground exclusively focused on the development of ethnographic information. 
In countries with much smaller-scale US troop commitments than Iraq, Military 
Cooperation Group commanders could direct and coordinate counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency operations, such as those conducted by David and a few companions.  
But let there be no mistake: this study does not propose that counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency are the same thing.  They are not.  However, the two approaches do 
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share some aspects in common, relevant to the focus of this thesis.  Those aspects in 
common are the need for ethnographic information, the need for long term presence in 
order to be effective, and the principle that the vast majority of the action is best done 
“by, with, and through” the host nation.  All three of those factors argue that the MCG is 
the best command and control tool in these types of long term fights.  The majority of the 
‘by, with, and through’ fight should be conducted by the host nation forces, and this 
frequently requires American advisors.  
While advisors’ work is in the field, wherever that takes them, the natural home 
base for these US personnel is in the MCG—the logical successor to the current Military 
Group (MILGP) or Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG).  The MILGP in El 
Salvador during that extended conflict provides an example of patient advisors assisting 
the host nation to deal with a security problem that was a threat to both the host nation 
and American interests.  One example is the work of the US advisors at the brigade level, 
who assisted in the rapid expansion of the Salvadoran army, and its counterinsurgency 
training (Waghelstein, 1985).  A second is the parallel work of advisors at the Salvadoran 
headquarters level, who helped the equivalents of the G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 
(Operations) staff.  Often it is sufficient to assist with the basics, such as professional 
education and training for junior officers and NCOs.  In 1982, the guerrillas were being 
supplied by ships from Nicaragua, and then transferred material to small boats that 
traversed the “maze of swamps” on the coast.  The Salvadoran Navy had some patrol 
boats, but lacked leadership, coordination and training until the USMILGP arranged for 
US Navy advisors.  Within the year, the host nation was disrupting the guerrilla re-supply 
routes, and taking pride in doing so (Waghelstein, 1985, pp. 47-48). There is a certain 
amount of controversy over the efficacy of the MILGP in comparison to the 7th Special 
Forces Group, who provided most of the field advisors. This controversy underscores the 
need to properly structure, rely upon, and hold accountable, the in-country military 
headquarters, and not depend on a unit in the United States or elsewhere to maintain 
continuity.  This will be further discussed in chapter VII.    
While El Salvador represents a counterinsurgency, roughly similar scenarios 
could exist for counterterrorism efforts.  The same principles could apply where a 
Military Cooperation Group works “by, with and through” the host nation to combat 
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transnational terrorism.  Such a purpose is certainly relevant to the current security 
environment, where assisting local security efforts overseas defends the United States 
from terrorist threats.  An example from El Salvador points to the blur between 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism: 
Another method that was particularly effective was a series of MILGP 
briefings on the guerrillas’ attacks on the economic infrastructure.  It 
wasn’t a question of the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] not being 
aware of these attacks, but rather a need to focus their attention on the 
cumulative effects and the regional emphasis of those attacks.…When 
graphically portrayed, it became evident that these attacks were focused 
primarily on the San Vicente and Usulatán Departments.  These 
revelations were then coupled with other graphic portrayals of guerrilla 
activities—road mining, bridge destruction, electric power line sabotage, 
and attacks on trucks and buses and crop duster aircraft….The economic 
potential of the San Vicenter-Usulatán area was analyzed as well as the 
crop losses due directly to guerrilla attacks and indirectly to abandoned 
cooperative farms.  Schools and public health facilities were also 
considered…. By the end of 1982, the ESAF had begun to think seriously 
about the nonmilitary aspects of the war such as popular support in the 
area and the deteriorating economic picture. (Waghelstein, 1985, pp. 51-
52)   
Today’s transnational terrorists have also used attacks for calculated purpose, 
such as the bombings of US embassies in East Africa and trains in Madrid, as well as 
violence in the Philippines.  It is easy to imagine an MCG having a similar discussion 
with a host nation to focus on the pattern of terrorist actions and cooperative ways to 
combat those actions, as well as non-military solutions to address their root causes.  
Enabling host nation security could represent the thin end of the wedge between 
America’s friends and enemies.  A current case worthy of study is the Philippines.   
While the current efforts of the JSOTF in the Philippines are not under the 
command and control of an MCG, there is serious merit in this arrangement, especially 
given that such a group would provide unity of command among advisors and other 
security cooperation personnel, which is not currently the case (LTC Greg Wilson, 
interview, 22 May 2006, Monterey, CA).  For example, the JSOTF and the current 
MAAG work hand in glove, but are not required to do so, and may not, if personalities 
get in the way.  The MAAG actually reports from the embassy to CDRUSPACOM 
through USPACOM’s J4.  A logistician is actually in charge of security cooperation.  The 
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JSOTF reports to Commander SOCPAC, the USPACOM special operations component 
(LTC Greg Wilson, interview, 22 May 2006, Monterey, CA).  These parallel chains of 
command should be resolved by establishing a single chain of command in-country under 
a Military Cooperation Group commander.  This commander could then direct a holistic 
effort, and report a consistent picture to both the Ambassador and the Geographic 
Combatant Commander.  This is not to say that every MCG should have a JSOTF 
working for it.  Some “general purpose” MCGs could exercise operational or tactical 
control over a group of combat advisors, but the small number of potential JSOTF 
headquarters—meaning Special Forces battalions and groups—could be reserved for 
especially sensitive regions that require unique focus.  The persistent presence in the 
“general purpose” MCG could alleviate some of the current strain on over-tasked SOF 
elements.  The typical MCG emphasis must be on the ‘by, with and through’ the locals, 
so trust is important, and getting the locals to do the primary action is in the long run 
more effective.   
For example, in the 1950s, the legendary Edward Lansdale insisted that the 
Philippine government take action against its Huk insurgents rather than try to cajole 
scarce resources from the US government, or impose a US style solution.  Lansdale and 
Ramon Magsaysay together recognized the need to provide a positive alternative for Huk 
insurgents who might be tempted to lay down their arms, and brainstormed the 
resettlement villages.  However, both men realized that the effort had to be Philippine, 
not American, for two reasons. In the first place, the United States was at war in Korea, 
which demanded priority of personnel, equipment and funds.  In the second place—and 
even more importantly—both men realized that an imposed Yankee solution had 
absolutely no hope of appealing to Philippine Huk fighters.  The incentive to lay down 
arms had to come from the Philippine government to Filipino people (Lansdale, 1972, pp. 
1-85).   
Enabling local personnel to undertake the task reflects three things:  support for 
the ‘ideology’ of respect for sovereignty; recognition of the reality that the host nation’s 
pride will only allow a certain level of US action in the host nation territory; and 
recognition of the reality that America has neither the resources nor desire to be the 
policeman of the world.   While the primary effort should always be from host nation 
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forces, another reality must be acknowledged.  With the expertise of a few US advisors, 
and the restraint from doing the task for the locals, host nation personnel can accomplish 
tremendous feats.   
However, sometimes a sprinkling of advisors is not quite enough and American 
units must serve in-country.  The preferred method should be that of units who deploy for 
short amounts of time to accomplish a specific and measurable goal, such as the New 
Horizons effort in US Southern Command (Kozary, 2001).  Rather than an open-ended 
commitment for nebulous purposes, such as ‘provide security,’  it is often more effective 
to have US units deploy for a purpose, such as National Guard engineers who use their 
annual training time to build a specific road in Honduras, or a training team to introduce a 
certain capability.  The purpose of building a particular road at a certain place and time is 
to serve an overall goal that the MCG defines, in order to support the Combatant 
Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Likewise, de-mining is another 
eminently useful activity.  Clearly, with long term presence by the MCG, such seemingly 
isolated events can create a consistent effort toward an eventual objective.  The definition 
of such projects and training efforts will no doubt continue to require negotiation between 
the MCG and the host nation authorities.  But with the permanent commitment of MCG 
personnel, they can help maintain continuity in the US efforts, and recognize the potential 
temptations of host nation officials to divert such efforts to personal advantage. Likewise, 
with the ethnographic information gained by immersion in the local culture, the MCG 
commander can avoid creating inadvertent advantage or displaying favoritism.  Such 
gaffes are easy for the newcomer to make, for example, when US and host nation 
personnel dig a well that happens to be on land under the control of a particular ethnic 
group.  Sometimes it is also necessary to distinguish between what the community needs, 
such as a clinic, and what the leader needs to enhance his standing in the community, 
such as a bigger town hall.  Americans, as the outsiders, can often be fooled, though at 
times helping local leaders can also be quite important.  Here too, continuity for US 
personnel also becomes important, since it would allow the US to figure out whose 
careers in the host nation to try to enhance, granting the United States more consistency 




C. TRADITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
So far, the discussion of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency acknowledges 
that sometimes US advisors will be involved.  This study informally defines traditional 
security assistance as efforts that remain short of the presence of actual combat advisors.  
A more compelling definition is actually security cooperation.  Formerly, security 
assistance was designed to aid the host nation in countering its threats, typically against 
communist influence, which was also to US advantage.  After the September 11th 
attacks, Rumsfeld changed the emphasis to security cooperation, more focused on the set-
up of the opening phases of US war plans (DSCA, 2006).  The proposed MCG does not 
detract from the war plan opening phase focus, but proposes that the meaning of the term 
‘security cooperation’ change even more.  Instead of a cooperative effort against 
communism, the meaning of cooperation shifts to mutual effort against forces of 
instability—at the moment represented by transnational terrorism such as Al Qaeda, but 
flexible enough to include new types of threats as they emerge.   
In the Cold War, there was an element of ‘pull’ from the receiving country, 
frequently for conventional hardware and training against the Communist threat.  This 
thesis proposes a bit less consideration of the host nation’s desire for hardware like 
fighter jets, and a bit more offering of training, education, and some lower-profile 
equipment for the establishment of internal control.  The presumption here is that 
American policy emphasizes the responsibilities of sovereignty among other nations.  
Those responsibilities include the maintenance of order against terrorist or insurgent 
movements that have or could develop the capacity to threaten US interests.  Especially 
for those many states which are basically willing, but incapable of maintaining such 
control, the MCG is the ideal vehicle by which to offer security assistance in the form of 
education, training and equipment.  This is not a new concept, and an example of training 
and education is the School of the Americas, now the “Western Hemisphere Institute for 
Security Cooperation” which has reinforced the Military Groups of US Southern 
Command since 1946.  In states that are both willing and capable, more traditional yet 
limited forms of security assistance, such as fielding F-16 fighter jets in Turkey, would 
still be well managed by a Military Cooperation Group that need not look much different 
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from current entities like the Offices of Military Cooperation, or Offices of Defense 
Cooperation, depending on the sensitivities of the host nation.   
D. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS    
Civil-military operations (CMO) provide an incredibly useful tool for the 
reinforcement of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or traditional security assistance 
goals.  In practice, all these activities blend so closely together that maintaining 
bureaucratic separations in the DoD offices of an embassy becomes counterproductive.  
Civil-military operations especially represent the nexus between American hard power 
and soft power, and can provide benefit far beyond their minimal costs.    CMO can range 
broadly from the very small to the very large and everything in between.  For example, a 
squad on either combat or training maneuvers with a single medic attached could provide 
rudimentary care to local villagers.  At the opposite extreme, the United States could 
invest in extensive reconstruction.  In between, an MCG could sponsor a particular road 
construction project, or a small JTF could maintain periodic veterinary visits, as in the 
JTF Horn of Africa.   
However, there is a missing piece to how such operations are currently conducted.  
They tend not to be closely coordinated, often lack focus in the original conception of the 
mission, and exhibit too little continuity in the execution of what become disparate 
activities over space and time.  Without focus and continuity, civil-military efforts, even 
if well executed, risk becoming isolated feel-good projects or photo opportunities without 
lasting impact.  The guarantor of focus and continuity should be the Military Cooperation 
Group.  The MCG is ideally situated to control civil-military operations, because both 
function at the convergence of the military and diplomatic realms.  At this nexus, civil-
military work is an ideal complement to the gathering of ethnographic information.  
CMO provide an ideal reason for the collection of such data, and the information helps 
ensure that the work and projects are targeted in a manner that avoids unintended offense.   
Civil-military operations can further American goals in several ways.  They can 
help deny safe haven to America’s enemies, enable us to seize opportunities via disaster 
relief, set long term conditions, or take advantage of unforeseen opportunities.  These 
interactions should be targeted to develop relations with local people, but for eventual US 
advantage, not just as uniformed NGO relief organizations.  In the best scenario, US 
32 
forces should conduct such civil-military assistance indirectly, through the host nation 
forces.  This was the genius of Colonel Lansdale’s approach during the Huk rebellion in 
the Philippines.  He recognized that the only truly effective CMO was when the Filipino 
military conducted the activities, especially out of genuine desire to ameliorate the 
situation, not merely to appease an American advisor.  Lansdale described civic action as 
“brotherly behavior” between soldiers and their citizens.  That Lansdale was able to 
convince his friend, Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay who, in turn, was able to instill 
this spirit in the Philippine armed forces, was a major breakthrough in the successful 
conclusion of the Huk insurrection (Lansdale, 1972, p. 70).  
One of the better examples of civil-military operations designed to deny safe 
haven to terrorists is the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF HOA).  This Joint Task 
Force manages rotational units as they conduct civil-military activities in the region. The 
primary purpose of such activities is to maintain an American presence in the area for 
some deterrent effect, gain some goodwill among the local population, conduct subtle yet 
overt reconnaissance, and assist indigenous people to develop the economic means to 
resist monetary temptations from terrorists seeking shelter.  In the words of one JTF 
HOA commander, a simple veterinary tour of the region to inoculate cattle is like putting 
money into the owner’s bank account, because that is what the livestock represents 
(Helland, 2005).  By extension, the improved economic stability of the farmer gives some 
physical basis for the campaign of persuasion to resist terrorist financial incentives.  In 
short, civil-military operations like these provide the tools to ameliorate the conditions 
that can contribute to terrorism or insurgency.  It is through activities like these that the 
distinction between civil-military operations and security cooperation is blurred, given 
that the local farmer with healthy cattle can then afford to refuse terrorist payoffs.  Later, 
further assistance could enable local populations to resist terrorist coercion.  Such 
operations are very much complementary to counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, not 
necessarily for the somewhat wishful thinking of ‘winning hearts and minds,’ but for the 
population’s physical ability to resist the coercion of America’s adversaries.  Such 
actions are better managed by a Military Cooperation Group attached to one of the 
region’s embassies than a Joint Task Force.  A JTF Joint Manning Document (JMD) is 
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not only difficult to sustain, but more importantly, provides far less continuity than a 
headquarters element that is on Permanent Change of Station to the area.   
A permanent but small presence, like a Military Cooperation Group, would not 
only be useful to continuous, low key activities such as in the Horn of Africa, but would 
provide an invaluable foothold for being able to react to opportunity by way of disaster 
relief in countries where we maintain even lower levels of activity.  Another country’s 
disaster is the United States’ opportunity, and Americans have proven very adept and 
willing to provide acute trauma care for short durations in the wake of natural disasters, 
such as the 2004 Tsunami relief in Indonesia (LTC John Maraia, personal 
communication, 1 October 2006) and the 2005 earthquake relief in Pakistan.  These relief 
efforts represent civil-military operations on a huge scale, and can ‘win hearts and minds’ 
for a brief moment that can provide entry into a region heretofore leery of any American 
presence.  The military is not necessarily good at long-term care for widespread chronic 
problems such as man-made famine.  However, the US military is very good at the 
massive logistics and quick response time for disasters like the tsunami in Indonesia and 
the earthquake in Pakistan.  The MCG could be an ideal way to capitalize on these 
strengths.  Much like the scout in quiet overwatch on an objective, a handful of military 
people attached to an embassy could prepare both the physical and ethnographic 
reconnaissance necessary to enable rapid relief operations.  Such relief may never be 
needed, or may suddenly present the opportunity of the century.   
Recurring, periodic civil-military work in combination with the host nation would 
set the conditions for doors to open, especially when it comes to things like basing rights 
for crucial operations or eventual collaboration in other activities.  With an established 
relationship between the two nations, the United States could create a faster reaction to 
unforeseen events.  A good example would be the pre-September 11th groundwork in 
Uzbekistan that paid off when an airbase from which to invade Afghanistan was suddenly 
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needed.2  In general, fostering stable relationships with other countries is in America’s 
long-term interests.   
E. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
One of the best ways to talk to people overseas is via a non-doctrinal structure 
pioneered and used by US Army Psychological Operations forces for years: the Military 
Information Support Team (MIST).  A small team or even a pair of information warriors 
attached to a US embassy can be powerful, and, logically, these teams should fall under 
the command and control of a Military Cooperation Group.  Like the MCG, the MIST 
works ‘by, with and through’ the host nation—in this case, local media.  Working 
through official local media such as the Ministry of Information can help avoid alienating 
political decision-makers in friendly or relatively neutral countries.  The purpose of the 
MIST is to disseminate messages that support US interests, packaged in appropriate local 
context.  
While Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are not the same thing, they 
must work hand in glove so that the words match the deeds.  Lenin called terrorism the 
‘propaganda of the deed.’  The reader may find it ironic to quote such a notorious 
revolutionary, and the United States certainly does not endorse terrorism, but Lenin’s 
point is well taken—actions speak louder than words.  The problem American forces 
encounter is when US actions don’t have any accompanying words to explain them, and 
the enemy fills in the void.  Likewise, there can be huge issues when ill-advised US 
operations tell a story different from the rhetoric, which is discussed in chapter VI.  Much 
has been made lately of foreign media outlets like Al Jazeera, which gain enormous 
attention among foreign audiences, resonate well with messages framed in culturally 
authentic terms, and are frequently at odds with American objectives.  In order to combat 
opposition media, American words must match US deeds, especially when a Military 
Cooperation Group conducts low key, persistent civil-military operations.  Media support 
can counter opposition attempts to twist American objectives, such as convincing local 
                                                 
2 In the late 1990s, the United States made diplomatic efforts to foster a relationship with Uzbekistan, 
and win it away from Russian influence.  US interest in the oil and gas resources of the region, as well as 
the prospect of counterbalancing Russian and Chinese influence have been compared to the ‘Great Game’ 
of Anglo-Russian competition in the region during the 19th century.  Since then, America’s relationship 
with Uzbekistan has been severely strained over human rights abuses, leading to the 2005 eviction of US 
forces from Karshi-Khanabad Airbase (“K2”).  In some cases the persistent presence of an MCG may help 
influence host nations to use restraint in their treatment of dissidents.    
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people that American-assisted well drilling is not truly designed for local well-being, but 
is a precursor to a fictitious invasion.   
The prerequisite for culturally savvy media operations is ethnographic 
information, which enables the US to know what we’re doing to help, not harm, local 
people, and convey that to them.  While the term ‘battle of the story’ is currently in 
vogue, it requires caution.  To envision US military media efforts as an advertising 
contest with our enemies is to invite the fallacy that more glitz will convince 
uncommitted audiences to support American goals—a close cousin to the fallacy that 
building an isolated clinic and then leaving will ‘win hearts and minds.’  Let Americans 
make no mistake—the nation is in fact currently in an information war with Islamic 
extremists.  The United States will also engage in the struggle of ideas with future 
enemies, just as it did previously in the Cold War.  However, a superficial campaign of 
glitz will fail.  The key to the information war is soft power, as the United States quietly 
and steadily presents the message of ‘who and what we are’, along with ‘what we’re 
doing and why.’   The United States can present a true picture of itself only if Americans 
understand indigenous social relationships and values, and if US personnel based out of 
the MCG can leverage host nation entities to disseminate the message.   
Even in countries where not much appears to be going on, the quiet, persistent 
message is important, because ideas build over years.  American military leaders make 
the mistake of thinking that a Joint Task Force can hit an area and begin convincing 
people that America and its ideals are there to save the day.  This is a dangerous self-
delusion. Strategic PSYOP or ‘Strategic Communication’ takes years and is best done 
quietly and subtly; the long quiet effort is what makes it ‘strategic’.  The short burst of 
high visibility activity, such as the effort to convince the Serbs to abandon their positions 
in the Kosovo war, represents the blur between operational and tactical levels at best.  
The operational-tactical level approach can be effective for relatively straightforward 
battlefield objectives, such as surrender appeals or splitting factions within the enemy 
military.  This is something that US Army PSYOP Soldiers and units are trained and 
structured to do, but could do more effectively if MISTs could prepare the battlespace 
from a surrounding network of MCGs.  The strategic mode of operation has been done on 
an ad hoc basis, with a non-doctrinal method (MIST) for years.  Now is the time to 
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institutionalize it, and firmly link it to ethnographic information and the execution of 
operations from US embassies, especially if this is truly to be a “long war.”    
Also, by recruiting local personnel and earning the cooperation of local Ministry 
of Information-type agencies, the US message can be produced and disseminated by, 
with, and through the host nation media, and therefore put into a culturally meaningful 
package.  A key example of how critical it is to use the appropriate people comes from 
the British counterinsurgency experience in Malaya, where the propaganda team was 
mostly ethnic Chinese ex-terrorists (Nagl, 2002, p. 93).  Similarly, Lansdale helped 
establish the Philippines’ psychological warfare program, and its civil affairs program in 
three dimensions. First, he persuaded the host nation to take action, and not await 
American largesse. Second, he recognized the nexus between civil-military relations and 
psychological warfare, in order to split the population from the insurgents. Third, and 
probably the most subtle, Lansdale used the combination of CMO and PSYOP to let 
democratic values quietly permeate both military and civilian society.  This represents a 
very effective nexus between PSYOP and CMO, and Lansdale capitalized on it.  He was, 
in fact, the ultimate democrat; he believed in the inherent goodness of democracy, and 
wanted to let it seep in slowly and spread by good example, not by imposition (Lansdale, 
1972).  While this may not work universally, it is worthy of consideration as a potential 
tool for countries in which US civilian leadership wishes to foster democracy.  As a 
policy, this usually appeals domestically to even the most imperialist US constituents, as 
well as those more inclined to encourage self-determination.   
Overseas, this version of Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power” (2004) helps to provide an 
ideological alternative to other peoples’ extremist ideas.  A similar technique has been 
used in Colombia against the narco-terrorist organizations, with the use of a MIST, host 
nation official personnel and, notably, individuals from the opposition who have been 
turned (Valentzas, 2006). The best type of influence is quiet and persistent, and does not 
always have to address a combat environment.   
A similar effort with more of a counterinsurgency mission is the MIST in the 
Philippines, which supports the Joint Special Operations Task Force working with the 
Philippine forces against Islamic extremists (Briscoe, 2004).  Other peacetime examples 
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include the rotational MISTs maintained for years in Latin America, both for counter-
drug efforts and de-mining public awareness campaigns. 
Over the years, the media support to US activities overseas has been called 
political warfare,  Psychological Operations, Psychological Warfare, Information 
Operations, Information Warfare, Strategic Communications, and Military Support to 
Public Diplomacy.  While words do matter, and therefore the title of such operations is a 
matter of significant import, the purpose of this thesis is not to debate these titles, but 
rather to emphasize the need for media support.  Portraying the true story of ‘who and 
what Americans are’ was important during the Cold War, and such information 
operations have become only more important in the post-Cold War disorder.  Regrettably, 
the United States Information Agency is dead, and its State Department incarnation in the 
bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has received limited resources or 
emphasis in spite of a great deal of lip service.  What this means is that without the US 
Information Agency operating overseas at its previous levels, the Department of Defense 
has little choice but to invest in buying media support for its military objectives.  Both the 
Pentagon’s Information Operations Roadmap and Strategic Communications Roadmap 
have addressed the gulf in such matters and called for more robust DoD efforts to 
compensate.  If the State Department’s Public Diplomacy apparatus grows, then perhaps 
the proposed increase in military psychological operations could be curtailed.  In the 
meantime, the best way for DoD to enact such media support is for a small number of US 
personnel, expert in local culture, to build a team of local people. Only the locals will 
have the cultural familiarity with themes, symbols, imagery, idioms, and so on, while an 
American Soldier will never be proficient enough. To think otherwise is, again, 
dangerously self-deluding and US military personnel will, in spite of hard work and good 
intentions, disseminate culturally or linguistically flawed products.  At the same time, the 
local people needed can only be recruited, vetted, and carefully monitored by long term 
presence and expert attention housed in the MIST, under the command of an MCG. In 
this way, the right words can be matched to America’s deeds, which is the key to the war 




F.  THE GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE 
As the United States enacts its Global Defense Posture, the MCG becomes all the 
more important for command and control.  The Global Defense Posture describes the re-
basing of forces into a hub-and-spoke system (National Defense Strategy, 2005, p. 16).  
The overall idea is to reduce the currently ill-positioned stance of many units from Cold 
War leftover bases, especially in Western Europe, to a stateside basing with unit rotation 
for training terms overseas.  The concept is for the Army’s brigade combat teams to act 
more like the Navy’s carrier battle groups and the Marine Corps’ Marine Expeditionary 
Units who go on ‘float’ to various regions for a certain number of months.  The Global 
Defense Posture would, for example, maintain a hub-and-spoke structure of logistics 
bases and outlying austere airfields, such as a main base at Ramstein, Germany, and a 
satellite airfield, hypothetically in Tunisia.  A network of Military Cooperation Groups 
could directly enhance this security posture by providing quiet oversight to the air and 
seaports in the hub-and-spoke infrastructure.  In addition to developing the appropriate 
ethnographic information on the local people, the MCG commander could subtly 
ascertain that the Tunisians are maintaining the promised austere airfield.  Some of the 
purposes listed above can be achieved or enhanced by units that rotate into the host 
country, frequently under the status of “deployed for training (DFT).”  The MCG 
commander is the ideal point of contact to coordinate the combined exercises between the 
US rotational units and the Tunisian military.  Before arrival in country, US units could 
take advantage of the ethnographic information prepared by the MCG.  In similar 
fashion, US Special Operations Command units have been conducting Joint Combined 
Exercise Training (JCETS) with their foreign contacts for years.  Here again, the MCG 
commander is the ideal agent to coordinate these exercises, offer ethnographic 
information, and provide in-country command and control for limited, small-scale 






V. WHAT HAPPENS WITH ETHNOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION 
A. LATERALLY WITHIN THE EMBASSY 
While the MCG is going about many of the duties described above, especially its 
study of local ethnographic relationships, its members will overtly and naturally discover 
nuggets of information that can be pieced together for use in our ongoing 
counterterrorism fight.  Such information could easily be shared laterally with other 
government agencies in the embassy.  Counterterrorism is now recognized as more than 
just a law-enforcement or military problem.  Counterinsurgency, as well, has long been 
recognized as more than just a military problem, even though US efforts beyond military 
means have not been extensive.  Once the MCG finds overt information that leads to 
potential use for counterterrorism, the MCG commander, in coordination with his 
interagency counterparts, the Ambassador, and the Geographic Combatant Commander, 
can decide whether to continue observation, disrupt the terrorists, or take some other 
action. It seems that such a group is the best way to provide eyes on target, stir up activity 
that will gain information, and then act or pass the information on to the appropriate 
actor.  If this is the aim, as it should be, then all the more reason that it be coordinated 
and integrated, with the full roster of American agencies on the same page.  
B. LATERALLY WITH OTHER MCGS 
The MCG could also become a powerful part of a counter-network in its region.  
But to do so, it must share information laterally with other MCGs.  This sharing could 
help create a more consistent regional approach, which is a current weakness.  Indeed, a 
telling example of lack of regional consistency is the Combatant Commander’s security 
conferences in 2003 and 2004 at US Southern Command, since the few times that 
Ambassadors got together were at the invitation of the military commander (MAJ Chris 
Muller, interview, 21 March 2006, Monterey, CA). Likewise, the trans- Sahara Counter 
Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is a follow-up to the Pan-Sahel Security Initiative, expanded 
to include nearly all of northern and northwest Africa:  Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.  This program of 
cooperation is specifically designed to help host nation governments gain control of large 
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expanses of remote terrain, and prevent the migration of asymmetric threats 
(USEUCOM, 2006).  Given the porosity of borders, presence of nomads, and the vast 
expanses of under-governed territory, this effort has been rightly approached as a 
regional task.  Since these are governments that have historically exercised little internal 
control, and represent societies where personal and clan relationships are emphasized to a 
far greater extent than in the West, it would seem that the persistent presence of an MCG 
would be tailor-made for the situation.  Indeed, the porosity of borders makes lateral 
communications between embassy teams absolutely crucial. Currently, this is a weakness 
among embassies.  The type of information necessary for a counter-network to act 
expeditiously is frequently quite perishable, and therefore timely lateral sharing is 
essential.  
Another issue is that Department of State regions don’t line up geographically 
with DoD geographic areas of responsibility.  The Department of Defense will not 
change Department of State procedures anytime soon, but DoD can use the MCG as a 
“work-around” for these problems.  The network of MCGs could ensure that any 
information stirred up in one country is transferred in real time to affected countries even 
outside the region.  For example, an MCG in Sierra Leone could find that money from 
conflict diamonds passed through an ethnic network appears to be only a local problem 
that would not affect US interests but, in fact, such diamonds are laundered through a 
contact in Antwerp to fund Al Qaeda cells in the US, Pakistan, and Mali.  The MCG 
commander could notify his counterparts in Belgium, Pakistan, and Mali.  The MCG 
commanders in Belgium and Pakistan would almost certainly inform host nation 
authorities and ask them to take action.  The US embassy in Sierra Leone would inform 
Washington, and let the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice handle cells on 
American soil.  The MCG in Mali would receive the information and, depending on the 
capabilities and willingness of the host nation, may ask the Malian authorities to act, 
conduct a combined action with them, or seek assent for a US unilateral action.  Since 
networks are an issue of growing concern, then every place that a dark network touches 
must be involved, or at least made cognizant of its presence.  
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C. VERTICALLY TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDER AND 
WASHINGTON 
The MCG commanders should communicate and take action in lateral fashion 
with each other as described above, which is the strength of a network.  However, it is not 
sufficient to fight a terrorist network with another decentralized network.  The argument 
that “it takes a network to fight a network” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996, p. 81) breaks 
down when one side must command its subordinates to act at a certain time, rather than 
just trusting their willingness for informal cooperation.  The American counter-network 
must include a hierarchy, with a chain of command that can task people and require them 
to act.  The crucial element of vertical control must supplement lateral coordination.  That 
vertical control must come from the Geographic Combatant Commander.  Decentralized 
networks, such as the current Al Qaeda configuration, imply that action depends on the 
consent of the members.  To fight such decentralization, a counter-network is required, 
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VI. PROVIDE A BETTER INTELLIGENCE BASE TO WAR 
PLANS 
A. ETHNOGRAPHIC FACTORS INTO OPLANS AND CONPLANS 
In addition to low key and small scale activities, as well as counter-network style 
operations, the ability to prepare for large scale intervention is also critical.  Simply put, 
American forces at this time do not incorporate ethnographic information into Operations 
Plans (OPLANS), Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) or Functional Plans 
(FUNCPLANS).  A huge contribution in overcoming this deficiency could be made by a 
permanent network of Military Cooperation Groups—who fuse the expertise of their 
attachés and security cooperation personnel—in concert with their respective Geographic 
Combatant Commanders. A system of MCGs could ensure that the base assumptions in 
war plans are accurate.  MCGs should participate intensively in the review cycle for these 
plans, and rotate well-informed staff officers into the combatant commands.  They would 
be extremely well-positioned to provide personnel with in-country experience if a Joint 
Task Force were to become necessary.  
B. INSURE THAT BASE ASSUMPTIONS ARE WELL GROUNDED 
The most glaring gap when it comes to ‘Operational Preparation of the 
Battlespace’ or “shaping the battlefield” (Meyer, 2003), is the lack of cultural knowledge.  
The current parlance in Washington is the term “cultural intelligence” or “cultural 
awareness” (Scales, 2004), but this study prefers the more accurate term “ethnographic 
information.”  Regrettably, in many current plans such detailed ethnographic information 
is not included in Annex B (Intelligence), or the psychological operations or civil affairs 
annexes.  United States forces, for all their talent, simply do not collect and document this 
type of information well, and certainly not very well in the average war plan.  Just as 
disturbing is the lack of such ethnographic information in the base assumptions of the 
typical contingency plan.  All too often, the new planner reports to the J-5 section of the 
Combatant Commander, picks up an OPLAN or CONPLAN, and finds no more 
insightful base assumptions than that the target country or its neighbor will give the US 
forces overflight, seaport or basing rights.  While ethnographic information may not 
always be crucial, such information is always worth developing because it might offer the 
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commander an option for a significantly different course of action.  Imagine how much 
more useful it could be to find in either the assumptions or intelligence annex the 
suggestion that a particular tribe of pastoral nomads who pass through the target area of 
operations could be enticed to conduct certain forms of reconnaissance for US forces 
across a border or into outlying areas.  It would also be enlightening to know that such 
nomads may provide information about a particular rival group, but would never betray 
their kinsmen in a region of US interest.  Such knowledge could generate radical 
alternatives in the combatant commander’s list of courses of action.  Sadly, this illustrates 
the most disturbing point of all.  Such ethnographic information is not usually considered 
in course of action development during the Commander’s Estimate Process or the 
remainder of the Military Decision-making Process (Wilson & Young, 2001), and thus 
the ethnographic conditions of the target area become either opportunities never realized, 
or hidden pitfalls discovered only after seemingly logical, yet disastrous, actions taken by 
US forces.  Such culturally ill-advised US operations become liabilities in the battle of 
the story when American actions don’t match their rhetoric.   
An encouraging sign is the recent publication of DoD Directive 3000.05, which 
directs the Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop intelligence campaign plans 
for stability operations, which must include as a minimum: “Information on key ethnic, 
cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships…” (2005, p. 9, paragraphs 
5.9.2 to 5.9.2.1).  The only way to gather such information to fulfill this requirement, 
however, is to spend a long time in-country, which is again recognized by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense England, in the same directive, in which he tasks USD (Personnel 
and Readiness) to “Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop 
stability operations skills by…learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including 
long-term immersion in foreign societies” (DoD 3000.05, 2005, p. 6, paragraphs 5.3.4 to 
5.3.4.3).  A very effective way to study foreign cultures and to translate that information 
into useable material for US military plans is to emplace Military Cooperation Groups 
into each country where the United States has an embassy.  While it remains to be seen 
whether a structural change will create an attitude shift within DoD, such a structural 
initiative could be the most helpful “work-around” for current deficiencies generating 
from US organizational culture.     
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Ethnographic information should also be considered critical to the contingency 
plans maintained by US combatant commanders.  For example, there has been much 
discussion of late about how American forces did not really understand the tribal 
networks of Iraq, and how this has been a partial factor in the serious difficulties in the 
current insurgency.  With consistent attention and the right training, knowledge like this 
could be built into war plans that rest on the shelf, and could be updated in the regular 
two-year plan review cycle, to insure currency.  Ethnographic information could have 
allowed US forces in Iraq to use tribal networks to advantage from the outset, and not 
have to figure it out by trial and error, based on the personality and initiative of singular 
commanders.  One such commander is Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan who, during his 
tour in Iraq, figured out how to use the local sheiks to control their population, and ease 
the burden on American troops:  
The key is a "truce" brokered by the National League of Sheiks and Tribal 
Leaders and US Army Lt. Col. Tim Ryan, the 1st Cavalry Division officer 
responsible for Abu Ghraib -- a Sunni Triangle town west of Baghdad and 
a hotbed of the insurgency.  Under the agreement, Ryan now meets 
regularly with tribal leaders and provides them with lists of residents 
suspected of taking part in attacks. The sheiks and their subordinate local 
clan leaders then promise to keep their kinsmen in line. Newly released 
Abu Ghraib prisoners are similarly turned over with a tribal assurance of 
good behavior.  "We tell them that these guys are your responsibility 
now," Ryan said. "They do have a lot of influence. To ignore that is to 
ignore 6,000 years of the way business has been done here."  In return, 
Ryan has drastically reduced the amount of anti-insurgent raids and house 
searches—essentially trusting the sheiks to police their own.  "If there's 
any kind of information about somebody, the Americans have to come to 
the local leader. He'll go personally to the suspect and say, 'Stop -- this is 
your last chance,' " said Sheik Mohammed Khamis Saadi, national head of 
the Saadi tribe and vice president of the league of sheiks. "We have the 
same blood. I'm responsible for them. It's my duty to give them another 
chance." … After the invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein's government, 
Saadi said, the Americans made a fundamental mistake by interpreting 
Iraq's societal dynamics along purely religious and ethnic lines. "They 
came and saw the society as Kurds, Sunnis, Turks, Shiites and Christians," 
he said. "They didn't understand the tribal culture." (Khalil, 2004, p. A8) 
With MCGs laying the groundwork for exactly this kind of an approach, there 
would be less time spent in on-the-job learning.   
C. PARTICIPATE INTENSIVELY IN THE REVIEW CYCLE FOR PLANS 
46 
Once the MCG is emplaced, has developed a store of ethnographic information, 
and applied that knowledge to the theater commander’s contingency plans, the task is still 
not complete.  Operational plans are supposed to be reviewed on a two year cycle (Joint 
Forces Staff College Publication 1) and, given the potential for changes in local power 
structures, it is imperative that the MCGs assist in updating the plans on time.  
Relationships between two tribes can change due to feuds, marriages between leading 
families, and alliances of convenience or economic gain.  Social changes usually take 
place over time, and are difficult to identify or quantify at first, so a two year review 
cycle on contingency plans is probably still appropriate and would generally carry no 
greater risk than currently exists.  Naturally, a dramatic shift noted by an MCG could 
prompt an out-of-cycle review for a plan, between the Combatant Commander’s J-5 
office, presumably with his J-2 and J-3 participating, and the one or more MCGs 
concerned.    
D. ROTATE WELL-INFORMED STAFF MEMBERS TO THE RELEVANT 
COMBATANT COMMAND 
The Military Cooperation Groups on the ground should work closely with the 
Combatant Commander’s staff for more than just contingency plan review in the J-5 
office.  The MCG must be in close contact with the GCC’s J-2 Intelligence, J-3 
Operations, J-4 Logistics directorates at a bare minimum, and any other relevant staff 
sections as well.  The logical destination for the ethnographic information and any 
coincidental intelligence items would be the J-2 directorate.  Any actions or exercises that 
the MCG anticipates or proposes should be coordinated with the J-3 shop, as well as with 
the J-5 shop regarding their impact on future operations plans or contingency plans.  
Frequently, transportation, infrastructure, and security assistance material will require 
coordination with the GCC J-4, as well as the J-3.  It makes sense, therefore, that when 
the time comes for the eventual rotation of long-term Military Cooperation Group 
personnel, many of them should find places in the corresponding Combatant Command 
headquarters.   
Today, Defense Attaché and Security Cooperation personnel sometimes rotate to 
the Combatant Command, usually to the J-5 plans and policy directorate, but not 
consistently enough.  Certainly it is logical that some American Foreign Area Officers 
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rotate back to Washington for tours in the headquarters of both the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  Personnel from 
the expanded future Military Cooperation Groups should probably continue to do so.  
However, US personnel should remain longer in-country in the MCG, and rotate into 
more Combatant Command directorates than just the J-5.  The Combatant Commander’s 
staff should be better saturated with veterans of the MCGs, which would take advantage 
of their experience and relationships with host nation personnel.  Simply put, the GCC 
staff would greatly benefit from a broad population of true regional experts, rather than 
the current population of staff officers who may or may not have any experience in the 
theater.     
Additionally, the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) should be greatly expanded, 
as it is an ideal partner to the MCG and GCC staff.  Officers who are exchanged or 
seconded to another nation’s military have a unique opportunity to develop cultural 
expertise.  The personal ties that US officers make can last a full career, as in the case of 
Colonel Jeff Donald.  This simple and low cost program has been in place for years, but 
remains an undiscovered gem. Regrettably, the 2002 American Servicemembers 
Protection Act nearly shut down the exchange program, creating a “chilling effect on 
some military training that US forces once conducted abroad, and limited some weapons 
sales” (Lubold, 2006, p. 32).               
E. PROVIDE PERSONNEL WITH IN-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE IF A JTF 
BECOMES NEEDED 
In addition to quiet, persistent presence and expertise to the theater commander, a 
network of Military Cooperation Groups could directly benefit field operations by 
making key personnel available to the commander of a Joint Task Force, should one be 
needed.  A significant purpose of the MCG network would be to identify and address 
problems before they become large enough to require a JTF.  A significant benefit, 
previously described, could be to take the Joint Task Force from its current default 
position close to the planner’s list of first resorts and, through the use of Military 
Cooperation Groups, move the JTF to the weapon of last resort.  Joint Task Forces are 
difficult to stand up, but even more painful to sustain over time in routine operations, as 
previously mentioned.  That said, there will undoubtedly be times when a robust task 
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force proves necessary.  As a rule of thumb, a small MCG could handle relatively 
peaceful pursuits.  An expanded MCG could control training, advising and equipping 
host nation forces to conduct their own operations with US support.  However, when US 
forces conduct combat operations, even with host nation forces in a secondary role, a US 
JTF will probably be required.  Such a task force will usually be ‘joint,’ and frequently 
‘combined’ in national composition.  At this point, it is imperative to offer the CJTF 
Commander as much regional expertise as possible.  A very practical way to do this is to 
offer the JTF Commander the option to incorporate the relevant MCGs into his JTF 
headquarters.  There may be times when it is politically smarter to keep the two elements 
separate, since the JTF should leave after a relatively short time, preferably with an exit 
that has been enabled by the preparatory work of the MCGs, while the MCGs must stay 
in their respective countries and continue to face their host nation contacts daily.  For host 
nation relations, it may be more expedient to co-locate, but not merge the two elements.  
Conversely, if the situation warrants, it may be far more streamlined for command and 
control to have the JTF incorporate the MCG into its headquarters.  
Two examples of what might have been are again the tsunami relief in Indonesia 
and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. In the absence of an MCG on the ground in 
Indonesia, a Marine headquarters in Okinawa was tasked as the JTF lead.  One expert, 
then-Major John Maraia, a Special Forces officer oriented toward that region, had been a 
US student at the Indonesian staff college for a full year.  However, Major Maraia was 
stationed at US Joint Forces Command in Virginia, and had to volunteer for temporary 
duty in the tsunami relief effort; no one knew how to access his knowledge or include 
him (author’s experience and personal correspondence).  Likewise, in Pakistan, the newly 
arrived director of the Office of the Defense Representative (ODRP), BG Sandy 
Davidson had few military experts to fall in on when the earthquake hit.  The US 
embassy in Pakistan could muster so little military continuity that the Commander of US 
Central Command chose to bring a Navy headquarters off its command ship, seven 
hundred miles inland in order to have a cohesive, practiced command element to 
coordinate relief efforts (RDML Michael Lefever, presentation and interview, May 30, 
2006, Monterey, CA).  Neither of these JTF commanders had any real element on the 
ground to prepare the ‘battlespace’ or ‘environment’ for them.  Those task forces, which 
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in spite of thin ground preparation performed admirably, could have been even more 
effective if a handful of experts had been permanently stationed in the MCG in-country.  
Perhaps similar but smaller contingencies could be handled by the MCG alone, but in 
large scale crises, when the ability of the MCG to command relatively small operations 
becomes overwhelmed and it becomes apparent that a more robust JTF is required, the 
JTF commander could have the option to incorporate the MCG personnel into the JTF 
staff, or keep the MCG as a subordinate element for advice and expertise.   
Certainly disaster relief efforts are not the only case where such expertise is 
needed, and combat operations can benefit equally from cultural preparation of the 
battlespace.  One of the best examples is Somalia, where Special Forces personnel from a 
year-long deployment on an infantry Technical Assistance Field Team were never 
consulted or brought into the planning for the subsequently disastrous 1992 large US 
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VII. EXISTING PIECES AND PARTS: 4 CASE STUDIES 
A. PIECES AVAILABLE, BUT NOT UNIFIED 
There are pieces of this MCG idea available today, but they’re not truly unified 
into a single system.  While one size does not fit all countries, the point is that the United 
States needs to consolidate its defense activities in embassies into a strategic counter-
network.  When it comes to the consolidation of a new system, such as the proposed 
Military Cooperation Groups, the looming question is whether it will work.  Since no one 
can predict the future, the closest comparison we can make is to entities in the past.  The 
Military Cooperation Group described in this thesis has never existed per se, but historic 
antecedents can be found. 
B. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: MILGPS AND RELATED EFFORTS 
Indeed, American military advisory groups in foreign lands have been around for 
quite some time.  A little celebrated but very successful World War II effort involved the 
US Navy, in combined effort with the Chinese government, training Chinese guerrillas 
against the Japanese (Miles, 1967).  Shortly thereafter, the US established a group for the 
support of the White Tiger partisans behind the lines in North Korea (Malcom, 1996).  
While the aim here is not to glorify the roots of special operations forces or the tradition 
of behind-the-lines actions, the point is that Americans have conducted very successful 
cooperative efforts with local nationals on both sides of the guerrilla/counter-guerilla 
fight. Americans have established these groups and gained the cooperation of host nation 
personnel during world wars, as well as in a number of environments that span the 
confusing, messy continuum between peace and total war.   
Many of the military advisory efforts came as a response to the spread of 
communist influence in the Cold War.  Notable and successful historical examples 
include the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) in the Greek 
Civil War (Cable, 1986, p. 14), and the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) 
that Edward Lansdale built around Philippine President Magsaysay to counter the Huk 
rebellion (Lansdale, 1972, p. 17).  Arguably the most famous, the Military Assistance 
Command-Vietnam, grew to enormous scale.  While its advisory efforts at the village 
level seemed to be on the right track (Donovan, 1985), perhaps a significant factor 
52 
leading to its unhappy conclusion was its drift away from the ‘by, with, and through the 
locals’ theme so crucial to the success of an advisory, cooperative mission (Krepinevich, 
1986).  Other groups, usually with the title US Military Group (MILGP) or US Military 
Advisory and Assistance Group (USMAAG), have worked out of embassies in Asia and 
Latin America for years.  While all of these efforts developed from specific needs, 
without an MCG-like organization in place, it would seem more advantageous to have 
persistent presence in all countries, tailored to the current need for strategic cultural 
reconnaissance and low-key action.  Two cases worth examining in somewhat greater 
detail are El Salvador and Haiti. 
1. El Salvador 
El Salvador probably represents the most successful recent effort at 
counterinsurgency, and was done by a small group of advisors, working ‘by, with, and 
through’ host nation forces.  In fact, this thesis proposes that the very success of the 
mission is what made it so easy to forget, and thus it is not considered in much of the 
public counterinsurgency discussion today.  (See Annex B for a snapshot of the MILGP 
structure.)   
In the early 1980s, the MILGP contained some personnel on a one-year 
permanent assignment in the headquarters section, which included some administrative 
personnel for internal function, and staff advisors to the Salvadoran headquarters in the 
Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics bureaus.  In temporary duty 
deployments were mobile training teams of anywhere from two to six personnel for the 
Navy, Air Force, strategic site survey, logistics, maintenance, Internal Defense and 
Development, and intelligence training.  Likewise, the Operations and Training Teams 
(OPATT) were five to eight man teams assigned to Salvadoran brigades, certain 
battalions, or particular geographic departments.  The exact numbers, locations, and 
functions were shifted according to mission requirements and conditions from the early 
1980s through the early 1990s.   The actual number of US advisors in El Salvador was 
capped by Congress at 55, which was sufficient for the initial assessment, but not truly 
adequate for expanded operations (Waghelstein, 1985, p. F-1 to F-2).  In later years, 
normal assignments of 3 accompanied years or 2 unaccompanied years were in place in 
the headquarters.  Eventually, senior OPATTs in the geographic departments were on a 
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PCS status, and some officers and senior NCOs spent one to two years in their zone.  
Most others were on six-month temporary duty assignments.   
Ultimately successful, the host nation and its American advisors withstood the 
Communist insurgency and enacted reforms sufficient to gain the support of the 
population.  One key issue that plagued the mission at the time and that still exists is the 
lack of consolidation of activities in-country.  The Military Group, working for the 
Geographic Combatant Commander, facilitated the combination of combat advisors and 
Security Assistance material.  The Defense Attaché Office, supervised by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, was not part of the MILGP.  The Defense Attaché was therefore not 
forced to coordinate with the MILGP, although common sense prompted most of the 
attachés to assist their fellow Americans.  However, there were a few examples of 
interpersonal conflict that inhibited good cooperation, and even among countrymen of the 
same Service one or the other could throw the trump card of working for separate chains 
of command: DIA and the CDRUSSOUTHCOM (LTC Gabe Acosta, interview, 25 July 
2006, Pentagon).  
There is a certain amount of controversy over the efficacy of the MILGP in 
controlling field advisors. While most veterans of the conflict interviewed for this thesis 
generally approved of the MILGP’s ability to provide command and control, others 
disagreed and noted that the continuity in rotations of appropriate, culturally attuned 
personnel came from the 7th Special Forces Group, especially its forward battalion in 
Panama.  This view posits that success in the counterinsurgency came more from the 7th 
SFG cadre’s ability to return time and again to work with “old friends” in-country, than 
any support from the MILGP headquarters (Hy Rothstein, interview, 4 December 2006, 
Monterey, California).  The existence of this controversy underscores the need to 
properly structure, rely upon, and hold accountable the in-country military headquarters, 
and not depend on a unit in the United States or elsewhere to maintain continuity.  The 
purpose of the improved Military Cooperation Group should be to provide in-country 
continuity, cultural expertise, and local friendships, thus freeing limited SOF 





A related example, although in a less hostile environment, is 1997 Haiti.  The 
former US Support Group Haiti was a close cousin to a MILGP for post-conflict 
stabilization.  The previous intervention by the US JTF was of corps size, and enforced a 
good degree of stability.  However, someone had to keep the situation stable as the Joint 
Task Force exited the country.  In order to do this, the US Support Group Haiti was 
organized. It consisted of about 600 military personnel, and was commanded by a colonel 
who worked for the Combatant Commander.  (See Annex C for structure.)   
A critic might point to the lack of progress in Haiti after Operation Uphold 
Democracy to refute the level of effort expended, but that would be erroneous.  The 
purpose of the support group was not to build a nation, but to control any backlash from 
the departure of a US JTF.  Judged in this light, the Support Group Haiti was quite 
successful.  The colonel in command recognized the triangular relationship of the 
Combatant Commander, the Ambassador, and himself.  Units that were deployed for 
training executed the Group’s tasks.  Seabees and Marines completed a road and bridge, 
while Army well drillers hunted for fresh water.  An Army Civil Affairs staff element 
focused on putting the projects in the right places, while an Army PSYOP MIST team 
supported the Group’s objectives with information.  Counter-intelligence detachments 
concentrated on force protection information.  In a sense, the US Support Group Haiti 
represents the post-hostilities phase of an MCG.   
As a precursor to the idea that the MCG could be a base for forces conducting 
operations, the USSPTGP Haiti provided a base for a company from 3rd Special Forces 
Group to conduct an area assessment.  Unfortunately there was no concerted effort to 
share any ethnographic information with the Support Group, whose commander had little 
authority to compel such cooperation.  
Another example of the interplay between unity of command and the gathering of 
ethnographic information had to do with the US Coast Guard attaché, who was present 
with four to six personnel.  The Coast Guard’s purpose was to teach the Haitian National 
Police force how to establish a professional harbor security unit.  At the time, this may 
have sounded trivial.  But, post-9/11, it is a critical topic, since in countries with water 
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access, smuggling will always be present, frequently lethal, and potentially a conduit of 
weapons of mass destruction.  The USCG attaché, while cooperative with the Support 
Group, was not under its command, which again made interpersonal relations the only 
potential key to success.   
C. CURRENT EFFORTS: MILGPS AND RELATED EFFORTS 
While so far, this study has proposed a system, and presented some historical 
examples to support the MCG, some examination of what exists today is in order.  It is 
important to note that the proposed MCG counter-network, which could be useful for a 
variety of functions, does not have to be built from scratch.  A full range of personnel and 
efforts already exist, and can be combined to good effect.  The most robust structure in 
the field is, by its nature, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  In Security 
Cooperation efforts, one name does not fit all.  Some missions have the title Military 
Group (MILGP), while others are called Military Advisory and Assistance Group 
(MAAG).  The missions actually carrying the name Military Group in 2006 are in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Venezuela.  MAAGs exist in the Dominican Republic, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, 
and Thailand.  The rest have various names like the Office of Military Cooperation 
(OMC), Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), US Liaison Office (USLO), Military 
Liaison Office (MLO), and so on.  Sometimes, security cooperation programs are 
executed by Defense Attaché personnel or, occasionally, civilian embassy personnel 
(Congressional Budget Justification, 2007, p. 599-601 or p. 15 of pdf file).   
The key point here is that there is little standardization among these activities, and 
they are certainly not organized as a counter-network to collect or act on ethnographic 
information.  From this perspective, the MCG would certainly offer a more powerful tool.  
Two case studies that illustrate current assets available, but that lack the proposed unity 
of an MCG, are the Philippines and Colombia. 
1. The Philippines 
Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines is an interesting current example 
of counterinsurgency.  It is not conducted by a MILGP per se, which could be a 
weakness.  There is no unity of command between unit advisors, the Security Assistance 
staff, and the Defense Attaché.  (See Annex D for the structures of US efforts in the 
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Philippines.)  Although the MILGP in El Salvador was clearly the main effort for 
counterinsurgency advisor operations as well as security assistance matters such as 
materiel and training, the advisor role in the Philippines is not overseen by a Military 
Group, but by the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), which has been 
conducting “aggressive Foreign Internal Defense” (MAJ Joe McGraw, interview, 7 
September 2006, Monterey, CA).  This does not constitute an MCG as described in this 
thesis.  The JSOTF reports to Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), and does 
not enjoy control over security assistance decisions and materiel.  The Joint US Military 
Assistance Group (JUSMAG)-Philippines reports to the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics (J4) at USPACOM, and provides the security cooperation aspects of the effort, 
such as education and equipment.  The JSOTF and JUSMAG may cooperate, but are not 
truly required to do so (LTC Greg Wilson, interview, 22 May 2006, Monterey, CA).  
Likewise, the huge amount of ethnographic information that is being gleaned by both 
elements may be informally collected by 1st Special Forces Group, but is not processed, 
archived and distributed in an established, unified system for that country. It would seem 
that the permanent presence of an ethnographic team could add continuity, and the whole 
effort represents a case for greater unity of command.  In addition, having an MCG 
element control advisors in the field could enable the JSOTF HQ to redeploy to a more 
sensitive mission, if appropriate.  While the Philippines effort looks reasonably 
successful at present, the jury is still out and it would make more sense to put US efforts 
under the same commander in order to present the Filipinos with a coherent front.  At 
present, the separation in US forces may place a burden on the host nation to coordinate 
American effects.  Arguably, while it is the Filipinos’ country and their 
counterinsurgency campaign, the principles of unity of command and unity of effort 
argue that the United States should present help in a coordinated fashion and not place 
yet one more synchronization effort on the shoulders of a host nation that already has 
enough internal coordination challenges. 
2. Colombia 
Another current example is MILGP Colombia, which is actively engaged in 
helping the host nation to combat the hemisphere’s bloodiest narco-terrorist ‘insurgency.’  
While originally designed as a counter-drug program, both the United States and 
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Colombia have recognized, especially after September 11th, that the drug problem is only 
one aspect of the deadly brew of crime, terror, and insurgency.  The MILGP is structured 
with a headquarters and advisor teams called Planning Assistance Training Teams 
(PATTs), modeled after the successful effort in El Salvador.  (See Annex E for the 
MILGP Colombia structure.)  As the MILGP designation implies, it is a security 
assistance organization, with ties to the Security Assistance Training Management 
Organization (SATMO). The ‘by, with, and through’ aspect comes with US support to 
Plan Patriota, which is the Columbians’ plan to beat their own insurgency, not a Yankee 
imposed solution (LTC Erik Valentzas, interview, 31 May 2006, Monterey, CA).   
The disconnect, similar to the Philippines and reflective of typical current US 
postures worldwide, is that the Security Assistance elements, any supporting SOF 
elements, and Defense Attaché personnel do not come under unified command, and any 
ethnographic information that they gather is processed in sporadic, compartmented 
fashion, if at all.  Any special operations elements, for example 7th Special Forces Group 
teams that deploy for temporary training missions, report under the operational control of 
the TSOC, not the MILGP commander.  The MILGP commander is the supported 
commander, and SOF is supporting, but direct control is not exercised.  This command 
arrangement is actually a step backwards from the El Salvador case, where all advisory 
personnel came under the command of the MILGP.  Similarly, any intelligence 
cooperation with the Defense Attaché Office, even for overt ethnographic information, is 
dependent on personality, not command structure and prioritized collection.   
Like El Salvador, there is a certain controversy about the efficacy of the MILGP, 
and a view by some that “what makes Colombia viable is the long-term commitment of 
7th Special Forces Group and a cadre that returns to the country and interacts with old 
friends from the host nation” (Hy Rothstein, interview, 4 December 2006, Monterey, 
California).  Again, the existence of such controversy provides all the more emphasis to 
improve upon the MILGP and create a better-structured Military Cooperation Group, 
which can insure continuity of personnel and the requisite longevity in-country.  
While the MILGP facilitates training and advising by the PATT teams, as well as 
provision of Security Assistance material, according to the description offered by the 
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current chief for the PATT advisors, LTC Erik Valentzas, the entire effort needs 
structure, and a new doctrine for security cooperation activities including both an SAO 
and DAO element.  From the operators on the ground, then, the notion of a Military 











VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to create an effective “counter”-network, consolidating the benefits 
described in this thesis, DoD should:   
1.  Make the MCG the First Line of Defense for the United States 
a. Establish an MCG wherever the US does not currently have a similar 
function.  (See Annex A for current levels and types of US DoD presence in 
embassies.) 
b. Build up existing Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché functions 
into more robust MCGs. 
c. Create an ethnographic information gathering corps.  
d. Charge the MCG with the counter-network mission and give it the 
necessary authorities and resources.  Since the authorities required are an administrative 
issue, they are nearly cost-free.  The resources required are miniscule in comparison to 
what would be required to develop sufficient cultural expertise in US combat units.  
Likewise, the savings can be huge when the costs of US forces conducting operations 
unilaterally are compared to the potential economy of force gained if an MCG can 
facilitate action by host nation forces.  Since many of the elements described in this thesis 
such as FAOs, Defense Attachés, and Security Cooperation personnel already exist, the 
cost of permanently embedding a relative handful of people in each country is a pittance 
compared to current operations.   
e. Put an agency in charge: either DIA or DSCA, but make a decision and 
empower it. 
B. FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Should the Secretary of Defense fuse together the three elements of the DAO, 
SAO and ethnographic corps, certain elements warrant further study.   
1. Career Paths 
First of all, the career paths and development of a corps of ethnographic experts is 
a huge issue.  In order to fill this missing capability, the recruitment, education, training, 
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assignment, management, and rewarding of such specialists is crucial.  Poor investment 
in people would break the program before it could ever start.  It is probably redundant to 
create a corps in addition to the current FAO community, but a “re-tooled” FAO program 
has some appeal.  This could be the option for part of the FAO corps to be the hybrid 
ethnographer described in section II.C.  It is important to recognize that the ethnographic 
information specialist must be devoted to this task exclusively because of the requirement 
for immersion in potentially obscure places.  Personnel policies must support such a 
radically different career path.  Again, the relative cost is quite low, as some of the 
administration, training and education infrastructure for FAOs could be used.  Second, a 
review of legislation would certainly be in order. 
2. Legislation 
While the Director of DSCA has emphatically noted the cumbersome nature of 
current Security Cooperation laws (Lt Gen Kohler, interview, 25 July 2006, Washington, 
DC), it would seem that a full review of how these laws interact with intelligence 
oversight legislation would be beneficial.  More responsive legislation could ensure the 
necessary resources, rewards, and task definitions to make the embassy military teams 
effective, and not merely a good idea.  Perhaps to be effective in the 21st century it will be 
necessary to break the bureaucratic difference between DIA and DSCA, re-defining 
military aid and military intelligence.  In this combined structure, attachés would no 
longer be considered ‘legal spies,’ and emphasis could be placed on the quid pro quo of 
cooperation for mutual security objectives.  Perhaps the definitions of cooperation and 
intelligence need to be re-thought.   
This thesis entertains no illusions about the difficulty of legislative review or 
bureaucratic mergers, but leaves such enormous undertakings for future study.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The security environment has obviously changed since the end of the Cold War.  
Unfortunately, the United States has not adapted quickly enough to two challenges:  the 
empowered network as a threat, and the lack of ethnographic information needed to 
counter this threat and identify trends before they become shocks to American interests.  
To address this mismatch, the United States needs a ‘workaround.’  That workaround is 
the counter-network of enhanced Military Cooperation Groups (MCG).  America has 
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most of the raw material, but needs to consolidate current functions, reinforce them with 
an ethnographic capability, and form it all into a counter-network.  This is a low cost, and 
relatively easy solution that doesn’t tilt at windmills to change the nature of US general 
purpose forces.  Such a counter-network can provide benefit far beyond the investment, if 
organized properly.  It is important to recognize that this need and general method were 
outlined by the Hart-Rudman Commission even before September 11th brought dramatic 
attention to it. 
We believe that homeland security can best be assured through a strategy 
of layered defense that focuses first on prevention, second on protection, 
and third on response….[After the first instrument of diplomacy,] The 
second instrument of homeland security consists of the US diplomatic, 
intelligence, and military presence overseas. Knowing the who, where, 
and how of a potential physical or cyber attack is the key to stopping a 
strike before it can be delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence, and military 
agencies overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working abroad, 
are America’s primary eyes and ears on the ground. (p. 12)  
The Military Cooperation Groups (MCG) proposed in this thesis, in concert with 
the rest of the agencies at the embassies of the United States, represent this instrument.  A 
network of such groups would seem the best way to provide eyes on target, identify 
trends before they become shocks, stir up activity that will gain intelligence, and then act 
or pass the intelligence on to the appropriate actor.  This counter-network could provide 
in-depth ethnographic information on societies, which is the missing basis for fighting 
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APPENDIX A: LOCATIONS AND COVERAGE 
A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PRESENCE AND POTENTIAL ACCESS 
While the term “Military Groups” implies USSOUTHCOM’s approach in Latin 
America, it is important to note that security assistance activities have several titles, and 
are controlled by the GCC, who executes the security cooperation plan authorized by 
Congress and administered by DSCA. For further illustration, see the Congressional 
Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 2007 “Supporting Information” p. 599 
(http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/), or p. 15 of pdf file. 
 Countries not covered by some kind of security assistance office are:  
Asia:  China, Iran, North Korea, Bhutan, Laos, Burma, Tibet.  
Middle East: Cyprus, Syria.   
Latin America: French Guiana.   
Africa: Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso,Gambia, , Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Gabon,  the Republic of the Congo 
(Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Angola, Malawi, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mauitius,  Sao Tome 
& Principe, and the Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco).   
In other words, a large swathe of Africa has no security cooperation arrangement 
permanently in place.  Some are temporary arrangements with visiting US trainers.   
Europe:  Belarus, Finland, Ireland, San Marino, Monaco, the Vatican, Malta, 
Luxembourg (covered by Belgium ODC), Liechtenstein, Switzerland. 
B. DEFENSE ATTACHÉS: PRESENCE AND POTENTIAL ACCESS 
The exact roster is classified, but in general terms there are about 136 DAO slots 
filled, although 182 countries have accredited the US with a DATT position. In about 35, 
the DATT runs Security Cooperation.  The SAO is represented in some fashion in about 
115 countries. Between the two functions the United States is represented in about 160 
countries.  In about 10 countries there is a DAO, but not an SAO.  In another 10 
countries, there is an SAO, but not a DAO.  The numbers look confusing because of a 
certain amount of overlap and underlap, as well as personnel shifts from time to time.  
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Of the countries with no SAO permanent presence, many have embassies.  The countries 
without embassies, which present varying degrees of difficulty when it comes to access 
are: 
Asia:  
North Korea   
Bhutan (covered by the US consulate in New Delhi)   
Tibet 
Note: Laos has a US embassy. The Laotians don’t host a US DAO because they 
cannot afford to send one of theirs to the US, and would lose face if the US sent one and 
they couldn’t reciprocate. 
Middle East: Iran   
Latin America: all capitals have US embassies  
Africa:  
Guinea-Bissau (covered by US Embassy in Senegal)  
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville, covered by US Embassy in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa))  
Sao Tome & Principe (covered by US Embassy in Gabon) 
Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco) 
Somalia 
NOTE: The only place in Africa without some kind of access is Somalia, (and even that 
is the responsibility of the US Embassy Kenya).   
Europe: fully covered   
C. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? 
 There are very few places in the world that are truly denied space to the United 
States.  Those that cause the most concern are, of course, North Korea and Iran.  The 
remaining countries without US embassies are: Tibet, Bhutan, Western Sahara, and 
Somalia.  In many other places, such as Syria, Burma, and China, access for US 
personnel is difficult, but possible.  The establishment of Military Cooperation Groups in 
many countries would take time and care, but is feasible.  For a great number of 
countries, especially in Africa, where terrorists can find safe havens, the establishment of 
MCGs would probably not encounter serious host nation government resistance. 
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APPENDIX B: EL SALVADOR 
The MILGP in El Salvador changed according to the need for advisory teams to 
work in different locations and address different requirements.  In general, the MILGP 
consisted of a mixture of functional and Service components: 
Permanent Party (One year assignment)    
• MILGP Commander 
• Training Officer 
• Air Force Section Chief 
• Administrative Officer and NCO 
• Navy Section Chief 
• Advisors to Salvadoran HQ 
o Personnel Advisor 
o Intelligence Advisor 
o Operations Advisor  
o Logistics Advisor 
Temporary Duty Personnel (Mobile Training Teams-MTT) 
• Navy MTT      6 
• Air Force Maintenance and Instructor Pilot MTT 4 
• Strategic Site Survey MTT    2 
• Logistics Maintenance MTT    2 
• Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) MTT 2 
• Intelligence Training MTT    4 
• Operations and Training Team (OPAT) advisors to units 
o San Vicente     5 
o Usulután     5 
o Airborne Battalion    8 
o Battalion Upgrade    7 
(Source Waghelstein, 1985, p. F-1 to F-2) 
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 In later years, this structure was expanded to include OPAT teams in every 
brigade and zone headquarters.  A senior OPAT was added to manage all the OPAT 
personnel.  
The integration of advisors with the Security Assistance structure was efficient.  
However, the intelligence structure was not streamlined.  Note that the MILGP 
Commander had US intelligence advisors to the Salvadoran headquarters under his 
control.  He did not have US Defense Attaché or other DIA personnel under his 
command.  The cooperation or lack thereof in the intelligence domain was purely the 
result of personalities, not authority.  There was no provision for gathering ethnographic 
information.       
The 55 man limit was imposed by Congress and became a matter of controversy.  
While the advisors on the ground always wanted to do more, and therefore wanted more 
US personnel, such an increase was too politically volatile.  In retrospect, some 
Americans proposed that the limit forced US advisors to require the host nation to 
develop its own solutions (Steele, as quoted in Manwaring & Prisk, 1988, p. 407 - 408). 
 
67 
APPENDIX C: HAITI 
The composition of the units in the US Support Group Haiti (USSPTGP) in 1997 
changed according to operational rotations.  For example, the deployable Navy hospital 
was replaced by an Air Force hospital.  Individual augmentees for the headquarters and 
“deployed for training” units usually stayed for 6-month tours.  The overall strength of 
the group was consistently about 600.  In general, the USSPTGP consisted of functional 
components: 
Headquarters 
• Commander (one year tour) 
• Deputy Commander 
• J-1 Personnel 
• J-2 Intelligence 
• J-3 Operations 
• J-4 Logistics and Engineering 
• J-5 Civil Affairs 
• J-6 Communications 
• Special staff: Chaplain, Postal, etc 
Deployed for training units (DFT) 
• Military Information Support Team (MIST): psychological operations 
• Force Protection team:  counter-intelligence 
• Deployable Hospital: medical civil assistance 
• Army engineer platoon: fresh-water well drilling 
• Seabee section: road construction 
• Marine engineer company: bridge construction 
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• Security company: guard duty 
• Crash-Fire rescue section: airfield safety 
Other units, not under Support Group command: 
• USCG Attaché 
• USCG training team: advisors to Haitian National Police harbor unit 
• US Defense Attaché 
• US Special Forces company: temporary duty for area assessment   
Note that the SPTGP Commander had an intelligence staff and a force protection 
(counter-intelligence) section under his control.  He did not have US Defense Attaché or 
other DIA personnel under his command.  The cooperation or lack thereof in the 
intelligence domain was purely the result of personalities, not authority.   
There was no provision for gathering ethnographic information in a systematic 
way.  The MIST, Civil Affairs, and Force Protection (CI) personnel became familiar with 
some of this knowledge in the course of their duties, but no system was ever devised to 
consolidate, process and catalogue it.  The Special Forces company, conducting a brief 
area assessment (similar to Operational Preparation of the Environment), did not share 
such information well with the Support Group, and the SPTGP Commander had little 
authority to compel cooperation.  Likewise, there was little sharing of ethnographic or 
law-enforcement information from the US Coast Guard training detachment, not because 
of an adversarial working relationship, but more because this was not an identified 
priority and there was no established system.   




APPENDIX D: THE PHILIPPINES 
The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) was established 
in January 2002, as JTF 510.  JTF 510’s mission ended in July 2002, and transitioned to 
the present JSOTF-P.  Its mission is humanitarian civic action and support to upcoming 
Security Assistance Modules for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), mostly on 
the island of Basilan and in Zamboanga City, Mindanao (Military: JSOTF-P, from 
www.globalsecurity.org, 14 November 2006). The task force strength is anywhere from 
50 to 300 personnel, depending on the tempo of operations (Wilson, 2006, p. 21).  The 
JSOTF is organized along Service components: 
• Commander (coordinates with AFP GHQ Manila) 
• Commander, Forward (coordinates with AFP SOUTHCOM Zamboanga) 
• Army SOF 
o CIVIL AFFAIRS 
o MIST 
o LCE: Liaison Coordination Elements consist of 4-12 SOF personnel and 
are embedded with select AFP units at Div, BDE, BN level 
• Navy SOF LCE 
• Air Force SOF LCE 
The purpose of the LCE teams is to assist certain AFP units in planning and 
fusing various sources of intelligence in support of counterterrorist operations.   
The JSOTF-P is not part of the JUSMAGPHIL.  The former commander of the 
forward task force (Wilson, p. 21) notes success in linking LCE teams with AFP units 
that have been provided equipment under the Security Assistance program.  However, in 
contrast to El Salvador, the advisors are under separate command than the train-and-
equip program, and the LCEs are currently prohibited from training or operating with the 
units in which they are embedded. 
The Joint US Military Assistance Group Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL) is 
responsible for equipment and training such as joint exercises and the International 
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Military Education and Training program (source: http://manila.usembassy.gov).  It 
coordinates large exercises with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but does not 
include a combat advisor role.  The JUSMAG is organized along Service components: 
Operations Division 
• Permanent 
o Army/Air Force Officer 1 
o Navy/Marine Officer  1 
o Operations NCOs  2 
• Rotational basis (varying numbers according to the mission) 
o Civil Affairs 
o Reserve Component 
o Counter-terrorism Liaison Officers 
• Joint Security Unit staffed by AFP 
Security Assistance Office 
• Army Mission   1 
• Navy Mission   1 
• Air Force Mission  1 
• Security Assistance NCO  1 
• Augmented by 5 Foreign Service Nationals, 13 Philippine Civilians, 5 AFP 
 
The integration of advisors with Security Assistance is not accomplished by structural 
design, but by coordination between two independent commands, the JSOTF-P and the 
JUSMAGPHIL.  This represents a step backwards from the efficiency of El Salvador and 
Colombia.  Again, the intelligence structure is not streamlined.  Note that the JSOTF-P 
Commander has US SOF advisors to AFP units, who are trying to help fuse all source 
intelligence.  The US Defense Attaché and his personnel are completely separate from 
either the JUSMAGPHIL or the JSOTF-P.  The cooperation or lack thereof in the 
intelligence realm remains purely the result of personalities, not authority.  While 
personnel from all three entities no doubt develop some ethnographic information, there 
is no provision for gathering, storing, sharing or using this type of information.   
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APPENDIX E: COLOMBIA 
The Military Group (MILGP) Colombia in 2006 has the mission to integrate, 
synchronize and coordinate Security Cooperation efforts in order to build Colombian 
military (COLMIL) warfighting capabilities.  It faces a blend of narco-terrorism and 
insurgency.  The strength of the MILGP varies according to the number of advisors 
deployed and usually totals about 296.  At this time, 118 personnel are permanent party 
on a 2-3 year tour, and the remaining 178 are on temporary duty tours of 3-12 months.  
The MILGP structure is a combination of Service and functional components: 
• Commander 
• Executive Officer 
• Security Assistance teams:  equipment and training 
o Army Mission 
o Air Force Mission 
o Navy Mission 
o Logistics Mission 
• Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE): Airspace and air transport 
coordination  
• Planning Assistance Training Team (PATT):  advisor teams with Colombian Army 
units 
• Force Protection Detachment (FPD):  counter-intelligence 
• Intelligence Integration Teams (IIT): liaisons with Colombian units 
• Embassy Intelligence Fusion Center (EIFC) (including Technical Assistance Team-
Bogotá): coordination with all US government agencies 
There is some controversy as to whether the command and control for Special Operations 
Forces belongs to the MILGP or the Theater SOC: 
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• Special Operations Command Forward C2  (SOCC2 Fwd):  planning assistance and 
training to Colombian Army headquarters 
• SOF Operational Detachment B (ODB):  Company headquarters 
• Usually 3 ODA:  Special Forces “A” teams training Colombian Army units 
(Source: Major Chris Muller, Command Brief MILGP Colombia, 13 November 2006) 
 
Note that there is no formal effort to gather ethnographic information.  This type of 
knowledge is collected to an extent, as intelligence personnel study narco-terrorist 
organizations, which is an encouraging sign.  However, as usual, the Defense attaché 
office is not under the command of the MILGP, and cooperation is still dependent on 
personalities.   
Likewise, the SOF trainers in the SOC Forward headquarters and the ODB/A are a 
matter of contention and there have been clashes among personalities.  While they are 
said to be under the tactical control (TACON) of the MILGP, there is a constant question 
of whether SOF personnel are controlled by the MILGP Commander or the Theater SOC 
(TSOC) Commander. 
On a positive note, Security Assistance functions are integrated with the advisor 
functions under the MILGP, as in El Salvador.  This represents a more streamlined 
approach than in the Philippines. 
While the intelligence fusion efforts of the embassy are laudable, it would seem to be 
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